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Land Revenue Administration During the Sultanate Period

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The problem of land revenue administration in India under the Sultans of Delhi has been studied by many European and Indian scholars but these accounts are either hazy or confused and in certain cases inconclusive. This has been mainly due to the paucity of material available on the subject or a faulty or careless reading of the original authorities. Without detracting from the valuable contributions made in the field of revenue history of medieval India by eminent scholars before me, and fully acknowledging my debt of gratitude to them, I have attempted elsewhere to reconstruct an account of land revenue administration as it existed under the Sultans of Delhi. I have in this short paper only examined a few important passages from Barani's *Tarikh-i-Firuz Shahi* bearing on the subject.

The first essential to a proper understanding of the system, as Moreland pointed out, is to realise that it developed gradually. Further we have to bear in mind that the principles on which revenue administration was based were the usages and practices of pre-Turkish Indian rulers, Islamic principles of revenue administration and the modifications which principles of *fiqh* had undergone under Turco-Persian influences in Central Asia and later under the Ghaznawides. We have, therefore, to study all the three systems—Hindu, Islamic and Turco-Persian in order to correctly understand the principles on which revenue was assessed and the machinery employed for the collection of the same.

From time immemorial every government in India, whether Indian or foreign, has depended primarily for its expenses on the share of the produce from land. There was a sort of tacit agreement between the cultivators of land and the rulers, the former paying a share of their earnings from land and the latter undertaking to protect the cultivators. The general principle as to the amount which was to be claimed from the peasant was, both in Ancient India and under the Turkish rulers, that only such share was to be claimed as would leave the

peasant sufficient means of subsistence—not too small as to make him desperate and quit cultivation nor so large as to make him refractory by leaving him the will and the means to rebel. The ancient Hindu maxim was that the ruler was not a “Charcoal burner”. A similar principle is again and again mentioned by Barni when describing the revenue policy of the Sultans of Delhi. Every attempt was made to encourage and promote cultivation for such a policy not only increased the revenues but was a means of providing food and other requirements for the rapidly growing population. It was a means of setting off famines and a mode of finding useful and creative occupation for the rural classes, who were in the words of a contemporary chronicler, the keepers of the king’s treasury and from whose ranks also were drawn regular soldiers and mercenary troopers. The treatment meted out to the peasantry was fair and equitable and the Turkish Sultans of Delhi were genuinely and honestly interested in the welfare of the agricultural classes. The government was neither sordid nor materialistic in outlook as at least two of our eminent historians would make us believe.

According to medieval Muslim practice the land was divided into different categories for purposes of revenue assessment and mode of collection of revenue. Firstly, there were large tracts on the frontiers of the empire and within it which had submitted to the conquerors after a fight and had agreed to pay a fixed annual tribute. In such territories the old Rais and Rajas were left in possession of their lands after their submission and were more or less autonomous within their territories.

In the case of lands which were conquered by force or acquired by capitulation, they were divided into different categories according to the mode of assessment, nature and extent of proprietary right in the land, and the agency employed for the collection of revenue.

According to Hindu political theory the cultivator had unconditional and absolute ownership over his holding. The state did not claim any proprietary right over land but insisted on payment of a share of produce from land in return for the protection offered by the ruler.¹ The ownership of the land by the peasant has similarly been

1. See Arthashastra, Book III, Chapters 9 and 10 (Shama Shastris Translation). Al-Biruni, Kitabul Hind, Vol. II, page 149, Translation by Sachau.

recognised by Muslim Law.² In India the practice followed was the same as in other countries conquered by the Arabs. The lands of the conquered people in some cases were appropriated by the state and the peasants were allowed to cultivate such land as tenants earning their share of the produce as the wages of their labour. In some cases whole rural communities would capitulate and they would be left in possession of their lands where they enjoyed a certain measure of autonomy and were liable to pay land tax. In the first category the land belonged to the state and the cultivators had no right to sell or alienate their holdings. In the second case the original occupants retained their proprietary right in land and were subject to the payment of *Kharaj*³, but were free to sell, mortgage or bequeath their holdings.

Again according to Muslim Law and practice land was divided into *Kharaji* land and *Ushri* land. That such a distinction did exist in India is evident from numerous references in contemporary literature particularly in the books on *fiqh* and hagiological treatises. In the *Fiqh Firoz Shahi* we have the ruling that if the owner of *Kharaji* land became a Muslim he was no longer liable to pay *Kharaj* but he paid only *Ushr*. This supports the view expressed above about the recognition of the proprietary right of the original occupant and variation as to the share of the produce according as land was *Kharaji* or *Ushri*. If we keep these two fundamental principles in view it would be easier to understand the spirit and the working of the system.

I will now attempt an examination of some important passages from Barani. The first passage relates to the position of *iqtadars*.

“While returning from this (Lahore) campaign it was reported to him (Balban) that *iqtadars* of (the time of) Shams-ud-Din Iltutmish had been rendered unfit and useless for service and did not appear at the musters. In collusion with the officers of the Diwan-i-Arz they continued to retain their villages. They stayed on at home and had leisure and enjoyment. That very year when the Sultan returned from Lahore to Delhi he ordered the Diwan-i-Arz to submit to him the records concerning the Shamshi grantees of land, to examine and investigate their cases and then take orders from the Sultan. The fact was

2. Kitabul Kihraj, Imam Abu Yousaf, pp. 35 to 38 (Cairo Edition).

3. Ahkam-us-Saltanya, Urdu Translation, p. 342 (Haiderabad).

that villages in the neighbourhood of Delhi and in the Doab had been assigned to nearly 2,000 troopers forming the household troops in lieu of their salaries. Many of these had died, and many had settled in the villages which had been assigned to them as *iqtas*. This contingent was styled as the contingent of *iqtadars* and soldiers of the centre. When thirty or forty years and more had passed since the institution of this contingent many of these troopers had become old or had died. Their sons inherited their villages and had their own names substituted in the Diwan-i-Arz. Those who were of tender age got their slaves in as proxies for themselves. These *iqtadars* regarded these grants in land as *inam* or *milk* (personal property) and claimed that Sultan Shams-ud-Din Iltutmish had given them these villages in *inam*.

During the reign of Shams-ud-Din and his sons some *iqtadars* were required to send one or two or three fully armed soldiers to the Diwan-i-Arz. And if some of them humbly offered an excuse for not presenting an armed soldier their excuse or inability to attend the muster was accepted (and condoned) by the Diwan-i-Arz.

.....such was the condition of the *iqtadars* when Balban made inquiries into these cases. He then issued the following regulations :—

“ He (Balban) divided the grantees into three categories. The first consisted of these who were old and infirm and incapable of active service. Upon them he settled pensions of forty or fifty *tankas* and resumed their lands to the Khalsa. The second category comprised those who were young and fit for service. Their salaries were fixed according to their merit; the surplus revenue from their assignments was to be taken over by the Revenue Department but their lands were to be left to them. The third class consisted of minors and orphans who held villages and sent their slaves with horses and armour, to the best of their means to perform military service. In their case he ordered, that suitable subsistence allowance was to be given to these orphans and widows for their food and clothing and the surplus revenue from their villages were to be credited to the Diwan and their lands were to be resumed.”

We know that on the intercession of Fakhr-ud-Din Kotwal the Sultan relented and cancelled his order but this passage from Barani

makes the position of the *iqtadars* clear. As the institution of *iqtadari* forms a very valuable part of the military, financial and administrative institutions of the Sultanate an examination of the origin and meaning of *iqta* is necessary. The status of the *inamdar* I have discussed elsewhere in this paper.

Iqta is derived from the word *Qatah* meaning some thing detached or separated. It signified in Muslim literature the act of bestowing or allotting a *qatah*. According to *Kanzul Lughat*, *Iqta* means the "the act of separating a part from the whole and to bestow it on another." In another sense it means bestowal of *Kharaj* from land on a particular person. According to Abdul Huq Muhaddis Dehalvi *Iqta* is assignation of land to soldiers in lieu of their salary and such an assignation may confer certain rights on the assignee. Such grant was not an unconditional grant and transferred no permanent proprietary right over land or over revenue thus transferred. It was a grant conditional on the grantee's rendering certain services to the state and his ability to exploit the *iqtas*. In certain cases the grant of an *iqta* carried with it a right of property as well but that was rare. The grantee enjoyed the *milk* or right of property over the usufruct but not over the *raqaba* or land. The right to the usufruct could be sold or mortgaged.

The word *iqta* has been translated by the word *fief* but it must be borne in mind that the *fief* in European terminology was something different from the *iqta* as used in oriental literature. The institution of the *iqta* can be traced back to the times of the Prophet but it had undergone considerable changes during the six centuries before the Turkish conquest of India. The rapidity with which the conquest was made necessitated a military occupation of the country and the soldiers had to be paid. Want of coined money necessitated the grant of *iqtas* as a means of payment and as a stop gap arrangement for administering the wide-flung empire.

Three different methods were open to the state with regard to lands acquired after conquest. The previous owners of the land may be confirmed in their lands on condition of paying a fixed revenue, or the state may undertake to administer it through its own officials by renting it away on *ijarah*. Finally the land may be given as *iqta* or *inam* or as *waqf*. In the first case the land revenue demanded may be designated as *Kharaj-e-jizya*; in the second case as *Kharaj-i-ijarah*.

An *iqta* granted did sometimes carry with it as mentioned above a proprietary right and was called *iqta tamliq*; such an *iqta* was granted only out of dead lands or waste lands and was in the nature of a *fief* given in property on condition of the breaking up of land and its liability to taxation after a fixed span of years. Another type of *iqta* is *iqta istahlal* connected with the right to exploit the output of the area and the means of production. Then there is the *iqta irfaq* consisting of right of exploitation of mines or working certain state monopolies.

To revert to the military *fief* or *iqta* proper, the characteristic of such a *fief* is that it does not imply a state of property but consists of an economic concession. It conferred on the *iqta'dar* the right to collect *jizya* and *kharaj*. The *jizya*, however, when collected could not be appropriated. It had to be paid to the central exchequer. *Mahru* in a letter strongly deprecates the practice of the *iqta'dars* appropriating *Jizya*. The *Jizya* he claims was the exclusive property of the *baitul mal* and that right could not be alienated or assigned. Sometimes the salary or emoluments of an officer were calculated in terms of money but the payment was not to be made in cash but by assignation of a certain territory in which he might settle down and draw his living from the income of the *fief* without paying any tax to the state while the whole income was regarded as wages and means to secure the maintenance of a certain number of military retainers. In certain cases the salary was fixed in cash and it became the first charge on the revenue of a certain village or villages and the surplus or *fazilat* over and above the salary had to be remitted to the exchequer. Cities or ports were rarely assigned though there is evidence of such assignations in the time of Muhammad bin Tughluq and Firoz Shah. If the revenue from an assignment exceeded the intended payment in cash, the balance had to be paid to the government. If for some reason or other the income from assignment fell short of it the state was expected to make good the balance from the *baitul mal* but this was seldom done. *Mahru* in an interesting passage evades such payment, when the claim was pressed by an assignee.

Distinction must be made between *iqta'dar* and *muqti*. In the passage above quoted we hear of nearly 2,000 *iqta'dars*. They were petty grantees supplying one, two or three troopers and claiming a proprietary right in their assignations. Then again Barani speaks

of 20 *iqta's*⁴ set apart to defray the salaries of the *Maliks* and the *Amirs*. This *iqta'* was only a revenue division the income of which was earmarked for certain persons. An *iqta'dar* thus was not a 'feudal lord' or provincial governor but a grantee only. A *Mukti's* position was different. He held the administrative charge of a particular area, raised and equipped troops, aided in the collection of revenue and was generally responsible for the welfare of the subjects in his territory. A *muqti* was not an assignee. He was an executive officer appointed by the Sultan to administer an area. He could be removed or transferred to another place and the territory under his jurisdiction could be reduced or extended. A *muqti* had to render account of his charge to the *Diwan-i-Wizarat*⁵ though this condition was relaxed in the case of *Ainul Mulk* when he was appointed by Firoz as *muqti* of Multan. In the letter of appointment preserved in *Insha-i-Mahru* all officers high and low as well as the people in general are commanded to obey his orders which were to be treated as orders of the king.

The *muqti* was required to maintain a body of troops. The strength and pay of the *muqti's* troops were fixed by the Sultan but the troops were raised, equipped and paid by the *muqti*. He was strictly enjoined to make no deductions from the trooper's salaries⁶.

The *muqti* collected the revenue and after defraying the expenses of administration he was required to pay the balance to the centre. Ala-ud-Din, when *muqti* of *Karra*, sought the permission of the king to defer payment of this revenue. The Sultans insisted on proper and regular accounts of the collections being rendered to the *Diwan*. *Muqti's* financial records were audited by the centre and the *muqtis* were sometimes severely dealt with in case of default in payment⁷ or discrepancies in their accounts. The word *muqti* as designating a provincial governor fell into disuse after the time of Firoz Shah.

We take up now two other important passages from Zia-ud-Din Barani's *Tarikh-i-Firoz Shahi*. These relate to Ala-ud-Din's measures regarding assessment and collection of revenue and the status of lands given away before his time in *milk*, *waqf* or *inam*.

4. Barani, *Tarikh-i-Firoz Shahi*, page 50.

5. Afif, *Tarikh-i-Firoz Shahi* page 414.

6. Barani, *Tarikh-i-Firoz Shahi* page, 431.

7. Barani, *Tarikh-i-Firoz Shahi*, pages 220, 556, and 274.

“He (Ala-ud-Din) ordered that whoever held a village in *milk* or *inam* or as waqf the same was immediately to be restored to the *Khalsa*.

The word *Khalsa* may be referred to as Royal Domains, in this much that lands which were not owned privately by any individual or any community belonged to the state. They were directly administered by the state in contradistinction to lands which were still held by chiefs or tribes who by an *ahd* or *Sulh* had agreed to pay *Kharaj* and had been left in possession of their lands. All grants made by the Sultan either to the army or men of learning and piety, or the poor and the needy, or lands which were assigned for the maintenance of madrasas, mosques and pious foundations or works of public utility, were made out of these lands. Such lands which included also dead lands were all *Ushri* lands. A grant of land may be made giving the grantee a permanent proprietary right in it; it was then known as milk land; or land may be granted rent free; this was *inam* land; or the income of land may be assigned for specified religious or charitable purposes and assigned to a mutawalli. The beneficiaries from all these grants were mostly Muslims. All such grants were resumed by Ala-ud-Din and grants in cash for above purposes were made. That the grantees in collusion with the Revenue Ministry misused the grant or abused the privilege is borne out by numerous references in contemporary treatises on *fiqh* and in *Malfuzat*. A grant of land in *inam* was not conditional on grantees rendering any services after the grant but was in recognition of past services or ‘good act,’ as the author of *Ilm-ul-Hisab* terms it. It was thus different from an *iqta*. Further it conferred a title to a permanent and hereditary occupation. This *inam* grant may be qualified by the reservation of a portion of the assessable revenue in case it exceeded the intended value of the original assignation.

We now consider the second passage: “Sultan Ala-ud-Din asked the learned men about regulations by which the Hindus could be reduced to subjection; and goods and property which are the means of rebellion and contumely should not remain with them.

They should devise means by which the same regulations could be applied to the *Khut* and *balahar*, so that the liability for *Kharaj* payable by the strong should not fall on the weak.

In pursuance of the above, two regulation were made.

1. Those who cultivate, whether small areas or large ones should

cultivate (and their liability assessed) on the basis of measurement and their proportionate share of proprietary right; and they should pay half (of the produce) without any variation; and in this payment there should be so distinction between *khut* and *balahar*; and nothing should be allowed to the *Khuts* as their perquisites (*huquq-i-khuti*)”.

This passage has been so often discussed that detailed examination is not necessary. But it raises interesting and important problems about the mode of assessment, the share of the government and the state of the village headmen and chiefs.

I will deal firstly with the mode of assessment. According to Islamic practice assessment of revenue was made on the basis of measurement of land. The measured lands covered the entire holding and tax was leviable irrespective of whether it was cultivated or not. Or, secondly, assessment may be based on the measurement of the sown areas alone and waste or fallow land was left out of consideration. The third method was *muqasimah* or sharing of the crop, that is, per cent impost on the harvest produce which is measured out and divided either at the ripening of the crop or after it had been collected. The three methods are not stated in historical sequence and one did not exist to the exclusion of the other. Ala-ud-din as appears from the passage, insisted on measurement of cultivated lands and not entire holdings as the basis of assessment. Then came the question of the distribution of the incidence of taxation. It appears that before Ala-ud-Din summary assessments were made village-wise and the headmen of villages were responsible for collecting the tax from the individual farmers and pay it to the government. This left the peasant at the mercy of the headmen who distributed the share of tax over others. Ala-ud-Din insisted on the headman contributing his own share at the same rate as did the other cultivators.

There has been some difficulty about the term “Wafa-i-Biswa”. Moreland gave it up in despair; Tripathi avoids it and Dr. Qureshi translated it as the “yield of the biswah”. Considering the context it simply means that the incidence of taxation was to be borne according to the share of an individual holder in the entire village under assessment—according to the proprietary interest the cultivator had in the land cultivated.

Ala-ud-Din demanded fifty per cent of the produce, the highest

which the law sanctioned. The main justification was that the peasant now paid 50% of what belonged to him and he did no longer carry other peoples' burden on him. Further, formerly the cultivator had to bear the expenses of transporting grain to the centre or a provincial town. He appears to have been relieved of this as this share of tax was collected in the village and at the thrashing floor. It is difficult to determine the share normally insisted on by the Sultans of Delhi. That it was in no way higher than the cultivators were accustomed to pay before the coming of the Turks is borne out by Hindu writers. The share ranged between $1/5$ and $1/2$ of the produce.

The Hindu landlords and chiefs at the time of the conquest were deprived of their hereditary privileges or perquisites. Policy and necessity demanded this, but when the chiefs' refractoriness increased Ala-ud-Din decided to reduce their power by depriving them of the means of accumulating wealth. He insisted on a more direct contact with the peasantry and wanted to disarm the landed aristocracy. He imposed a tax on grazing or *charai* in order to further impoverish the headmen and the petty chiefs, and make them dependent on the state.

Barani gives a long account of the revenue policy of Ghyas-ud-din Tughluq. The passage is a long one and is also well-known. I am giving only an extract from it in order to explain some terms which have been misunderstood and misinterpreted.

"He (Ghyas-ud-Din Tughluq) fixed the revenue of the Kingdom according to the rule of produce, this being more equitable. He removed the *muhdisat* and *qismat-i-bud-o-nabud* from the ryots, and did not pay heed to what the *Taufir Numaan*, (*enhancement mongers*), and *muqatiagaran* said to him. He also ordered that these said *Taufir numaan*, *muqatiagaran* and *muhaziban* should not be permitted to come near the ministry, of revenue and he directed the officers of the *Diwan* not to make an increase of more than $1/10$ or $1/11$ on *iqtas* and *wilayats* on mere surmises or conjecture or on the reports of the spies or enhancement mongers, and that efforts should be made that cultivation should increase every year and the revenue be enhanced very gradually".

Briefly, Ghyas-ud-din based his revenue policy on justice and equity. He reverted to the practice of assessment of revenue on the basis of yield—crop sharing or *muqas'ima*. According to this system the government share may be fixed before harvest on estimated yield per holding

or the actual yield may be divided at the thrashing floor. He remitted all new and irregular taxes. Moreland translates *Muhdisat* as innovations. This is not correct. *Muhdisat* simply means extra—*shari* taxes which were levied over and above the sanctioned taxes. The author of *Ilmul Hisab* defines it as any enhancement of tax without legal sanction or realisation of such taxes by force. *Qisamat-i-bud-o-nabud* has been translated by Moreland as “apportionment based on crop failures.” This makes no sense, and is incorrect on the face of it. Measurement as the method of assessment was given up as it involved expense and vexation to the government and the peasant both. When crops failed on account of failure of rains or other calamity, remission or reduction of government demand had to be made and revenue demand readjusted. In case of sharing of produce the government and the peasant would both equally gain or lose if the crops were good or bad. Further, in case of measurement as is evident from the practice of Sher Shah and of Akbar in early years the peasants had to pay for measurement (*jaribana*) and collection (*muhasilana*). To realise these charges a cess was imposed on villages. Amedroz defines *Qasam* as the act of “levying a part of the lands produce in kind”. Engers considers it same sort of additional tax on the authority of certain Egyptian Payyri records examined by him. He is not sure about the nature of the tax. Amedroz defines it as an annual impost on a village probably over and above the land-tax. This may refer to the vexatious cesses which were levied from the villagers by the headmen to meet the expenses of entertaining officials, etc., and which took no account of the prosperity or otherwise of the holdings. The author of *Mazhar-i-Shahjahania* refers to this as the contentions arising out of failure of crops and relevant entries in the *khasra* register.

We will now examine the words *Saiyan*, *Muaffaran* and *muqatiagaran*, and *muhazzaban*. The word *Muqatiah* is used for dues paid by one who undertakes the revenue management of an entire province or a major area. According to *Qalqashaudi* a village was let out on fixed terms to a particular person who was liable for the collection of revenues and payment to the state treasury. It was known as *muqatiah*. According to Enger it was annual due paid for an *iqtah*. *Muqatiagaran* would therefore stand for tax farmers and as there would naturally be a competition for acquiring such farms these *muqatiagaran sai's*, (reporters) and those who wanted to curry favour with the government would place the output of a holding or a village higher and thus tempt the revenue ministry to

put up the demands or increase the value of farms. To guard against an unwise enhancement of taxes Ghyas-ud-Din forbade his officers from listening to such reports. *Muhazzaban* means persons who form cliques and parties and try to do harm to others, by mischievously urging the revenue ministry to raise the revenue demand. The word may be read as *mukharban* from *Takhrīb* and may mean persons who by raising the revenue demand contribute to ruining the prosperity of cultivated lands. *Muaffarann* means those who made representations that the contract money should be raised as according to them the yield from these areas was much higher than the amount contracted for by the *muqtis* or *walis* or *muqatagaran*.

Ala-ud-Din had introduced the system of measurement and demanded one-half of the produce as the share of the state and imposed a grazing tax as well. Ghyas-ud-Din modified that system as already discussed. Firoz inherited the system of Ghyas-ud-Din as modified by the practices of Sultan Mohammed bin Tughluq. The following passages from Barani and Afif are relevant to the purpose and deserve consideration :—

“ Sultan Firoz Shah ” says Afif “ showed great liberality in bestowing grants on the people who swarmed round him in the hope of receiving rewards..... He (Firoz Shah) made grants worth 10,000,50,000,2,000 (and so on) according to the rank of the recipient. All members of the *wajihdar* army received such grants. This institution of grants was a characteristic of that sovereigns' reign and has remained as a memorial of him in this country ; the custom of granting villages in lieu of salaries did not prevail in the time of his predecessors. The author has been told that Sultan Ala-ud-Din often expressed his suspicions by remarking, “ A village should not be given in lieu of salary ; if this is done two or three hundred men living in the village would be under the *wajihdar* (trooper). It would be no wonder then if some of these *wajihdars* combined and vaingloriously deviating from the right path revolted against the state.” These considerations prevented Sultan Ala-ud-Din from giving away villages ; he paid the army every year from the public treasury. Sultan Firoz Shah was one of the *Sufis* and following in their footsteps he showed great generosity to the people throughout the forty years of his reign. Trusting in the munificence of God he banished all such fears from his mind ; he strove for the good of the Mussalmans and planned his

actions and satisfied the desires of the people. He liberally distributed lands and villages among the members of the army”.

“The Second Regulation of Sultan Firoz Shah”, says Barani “by the enactment of which the territories of Hind and Sind have become rich and prosperous, is that which orders the realisation of *Kharaj* and *jizya* on the basis of actual produce. Extra cesses, excessive demands (demands even in case of) crop-failures, and calculations based on surmises were totally abolished. Farmers of revenue, mischief mongers and those who suggested enhancements were not allowed even to approach the *iqtas* and *wilayats* of the territories. The king was satisfied with what the agriculturists freely and willingly, and without any fear, hardship or affliction, paid of the stipulated revenue.

No severity or roughness was ever used against the cultivators, who are in fact the mainstay of the *bait-ul-mal* of the Mussalmans. On account of the enforcement of the above regulation many provinces became prosperous; *krohs* and *farsangs* upon *farsongs* of land were brought under tillage; and wastes, wildernesses and deserts came under cultivation”.

According to Afif, Firoz discontinued the practices and the regulations of his predecessors, and introduced rules and regulations conducive to the happiness and the prosperity of his subjects. In the passage quoted above Barani speaks of Firoz Shah having adopted the rule of the produce. Prof. Sharma translated the words *hasil* as the principle of sharing the produce. This I think is misleading as what Barani means and what he has made clear in the account of Ghyas-ud-Din is that the revenue demand was made on the basis of the actual produce when the crops were either ready for harvesting or had been actually collected. Barani's complaint against Ala-ud-Din's system was that the latter took no account of accidents to the crops and the government insisted on its share being paid whatever the quality or quantity of the harvest. Ghyas-ud-Din remedied this defect by having insisted on revenue being demanded on the basis of the actual yield.

According to Afif Firoz appointed Khwaja Hussam-ud-Din Junaid who settled the government demand according to the rule of inspection.

This simply means that the revenue was fixed according to the quality of the standing crops. Afif speaks only of one settlement which

took about six years and the Government demand was fixed at 500,000 which remained the same throughout the reign of Firoz Shah. It appears that the Government demand was fixed in cash and the settlement appears to have been more or less permanent. What happened to the new lands brought under the plough after the settlement it is difficult to determine for certainly as a result of the peace prevailing in the time of Firoz, the beneficent administration of his, the encouragement given to agriculturists and the better means of irrigation contributed to the extension of cultivation. The revenue derived from such lands appears to have gone to the privy purse of the Sultan as is evident from several passages in Afif.

The assumption from the passage of Barani is that Firoz Shah settled the land revenue permanently in cash. His system is spoken of as the most beneficent to the peasantry and the assignee. It made the peasant prosperous and the assignee much more well off than in previous reigns.

This is a brief account based mainly on Barani, I would have like to discuss other passages also but that is not possible under the present circumstances. The organization of the ministry of revenue, the duties and functions of the officers of this department, the right and obligations of the assignees, the landlords, and the peasant, will be discussed later.

(To be continued)

Taqi-ud-Din Kashi's Account of Mir Muhammad Ma'sum Bhakkari

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The *Khulasat al-Ash'ar wa Zubdat al-Afkar* of Mir Taqi-ud-Din Muhammad bin Sharf-ud-Din al-Husaini "Zikri" of Kashan, also known as the *Tazkira-fi-Taqi Kashi*, is a very valuable but rare work on the biographies of the Persian poets. Only few copies of this compendious work seem to be extant. A. Sprenger noticed one MS. in the "Catalogue of Arabic, Persian and Hindustani MSS. of the Libraries of the kings of Oudh"¹ Bland mentioned another in the Journal of R.A.S.² The British Museum has an incomplete copy.³ Rieu notices an abridgement at Berlin and an incomplete volume at Petersburg.⁴ Dr. Nazir Ahmad has referred to a copy that exists at the *Kitab Khana-yi-Milli*, TEHRAN.⁵ Apart from these I came across a complete copy of this work in the John Rylands Library at Manchester, which originally formed part of the Bibliotheca Lindesiana.⁶

Taqi Kashi's *Tazkira* was begun in 985/1578 and completed in 1016/1607-8, and is therefore an earlier work than Taqi Awhadi's celebrated *'Aarfat al Ashiqin wa 'Arasat al-'Arifin*, written between 1022/1613 and 1024/1615⁷ and widely quoted by later *Tazkira* writers.

It probably served as a source material for the extensive work of Taqi Awhadi, which is, however, more widely known than the former. This is probably because Kashi's work is scarce; and later writers have not been able to utilise the few copies that are known to exist.⁸

1. Calcutta, 1854, pp. 13—46.

2. Vol. IX, pp. 126—34.

3. Rieu, Supplement, p. 72, No. Or. 3506.

4. *Ibid.*

5. See *Ma'arif*, August, 1960, p. 137.

6. See Hand list of Oriental MSS; p. 223, No. 312.

7. See Dr. Nazir Ahmed's article in *Islamic Culture*, Vol. XXXII, No. 4, p. 292.

8. Some later *Tazkiras* such as *Safina-yi-Khwushgu* and *Riyaz ash-Shu'ara* however, seem to have borrowed from Kashi.

Sprenger, however, did a good job in giving a fairly detailed description of this work in his catalogue.⁹ This contains, among other things, a summarized account of Mir Muhammad Ma'sum's visit to the court of Shah Abbas Safawi of Persia as an envoy of the Moghul emperor Akbar.

Kashi's work is divided in four *Rukns* with an introductory chapter and a *Khatima*. The Manchester Codex contains all these parts. The *Khatima* is really an appendix which was written after the main body of the work was completed, and it contains reminiscences of the author's last years, and biographies and selections from the contemporary poets.

Taqi Kashi had met Mir Ma'sum at Kashan when the latter visited Persia in Rajab 1012/Dec. 1603. He was greatly overwhelmed by Mir Ma'sum's poetic talents and other personal attainments; and has devoted full 8 folios in the *Khatima* in lavishing extravagant praises and encomium on this distinguished ambassador. Although this account does not give Mir Ma'sum's full biographical sketch, it contains some useful information which has not come to light yet. I shall confine myself to some of these few points.

Kashi throughout prefixes Mir Ma'sum's name with the title of 'Amin al-Mulk'. This would counter the statement of the *Ma'asir al-Umara* that Mir Ma'sum received this title from Jahangir in 1015/160-7.¹⁰ The *Zakhirat al-Khwanin* of Sheikh Farid Bhakhari (composed circa 1650 A.D.) which is one of the sources of the *Ma'asir*, does not mention¹¹ any date and simply says :

در آخر عمر که امین الملک دیار وطن خود شده آمد

The *Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri* does not make any mention of Mir Ma'sum. This would lead us to the obvious conclusion that Mir Ma'sum was given the title of 'Amin al-Mulk' by the emperor Akbar before the former was sent on the diplomatic mission to Persia. Even more direct evidence to this assertion would be obtained from the copy of the letter of emperor Akbar to Shah Abbas which is reproduced by Tadi Kashi where Mir Ma'sum's name is prefixed with the title of *Amin al-Mulk* in the body of the official letter.¹²

9. Op. cit.

10. *M. U. Tr. I*, p. 62.

11. See *Zakhira*, p. 123 (Mr. Rashidi's MS). The late Dr. Daudpota, in his
reversed memory accepts these versions.

12. *Khulasat al-Ash'ar* f. 486 b.

This letter is also included in the *Majma'al-Insha*, a collection of letter compiled by Ivaghli Haider.¹³

This information contained in Kashi's work leads us to another important conclusion, viz., the date of Mir Ma'sum's death. The late Dr. Daudpota, accepting 1015/1605-7 as the date when Jahangir conferred the title on Mir Ma'sum puts the date of his death at A.H. 1019 and supports his views by reading "بوده" for "بود" in the versified chronogram of his death inscribed on his tomb at Sukkur¹⁴ which is

"سال فوتش از خرد جسمتم بگفت "بود نامی صعب ملک سخن"
(1014 A.H.)

There is no reason to believe that the inscription has been mutilated in recent years, for the *Bagh-i-Ma'ani* of Naqsh 'Ali, written circa 1760 A.D. makes the same reading¹⁵. Furthermore we do not hear of Ma'sum in Jahangir's Memoirs, which would indicate that he had died at the time of Jahangir's accession. The chronogram which yields 1014/1605 as the years of Ma'sum's death may therefore be accepted as correct¹⁶. It might be asked why Taqi Kashi who dies in A.H. 1016 did not mention the fact of Ma'sum's death if the latter had died two years before him. The information probably did not reach him before his own death. Kashi gives us another interesting information which relates to Ma'sum's diplomatic mission at the Persian Court. He tells us that the distinguished envoy, who was about sixty years of age, arrived in Persia in the beginning of 1012/middle of 1603¹⁷. Shah Abbas was besieging Erivan at that time. First he went to Kashan where he met eminent poets like Taqi Kashi, Taqi Awhadi, Hakim Shifai and Muhammad Riza'i Fikri¹⁸. From there he proceeded to Tabriz. The Shah, after the successful termination

13. B. M., Or. 3482, ff. 214b-216b. Also *Bibliotheca Lindesiana* No. 834, ff. 120 a & b.

14. See late Dr. Daudpota's Introduction to *Tarikh-i-Sind*, p. xvii.

15. B. M., Or. 1761, f. 165a.

16. The metre of the verse is "بحر رمل مسدس مقصود و مخدوف" and the line scans smoothly with "فاعلاتن فاعلاتن فاعلاتن" with "بوده" the line would not admit of rhythmic reading.

17. *Khulasat al-Ash'ar* ff. 482 a & b Abdul Fazal's date is approximately calculated at Rajab 1012/Dec. 1603, and this may be the date on which Mir Ma'sum interviewed the Shah (see A. N., III, p. 1236).

18. See also *Bagh i Ma-ani* f. 186 b.

of the seige, summoned Mir Ma'sum to his presence at Erivan, received him with all the courtesy due to a diplomatic envoy, and bestowed great honours upon him¹⁹. This statement from a contemporary Persian source counters the account of the later Safawi chronicles—*Khuld-i-Barin* and '*Alam Ara-yi-'Abbasi*—that the Shah treated the Moghul envoy with slight and neglect, did not grant him any interview for many months and dismissed him most unceremoniously, in order to register his dissatisfaction over the Moghul emperor's continued possession of Qandahar.²⁰

Kashi mentions that Mir Ma'sum arrived in Persia with a retinue of one thousand foot and horse. This, in my view rather indicates the rank of Ma'sum which is stated to be one Thousand *Zat* and *Sav*. Opinions are divided on the question of Ma'sum's rank, and the statements of the *Zakhiyat al Khawanin* and the *Ma'asir* to this effect were not being accepted by scholars because the *A'in-i-Akbari* or the *Tabaqat-i-Akbari* put *Ma'sum's* rank only at two hundred and fifty. Kashi's evidence is therefore reliable for it is made from personal knowledge.²²

With regards to *Ma'sum's* poetical works and compositions, Kashi gives us some useful information. He tells us that he left two *diwans* comprising 5000 verses, whereas others say one.²³ Besides he wrote *masnawis* containing 12000 verses²⁴. While others say that he wrote one *Qasida* Kashi says two, one of which he wrote while on his visit to Persia.²⁵ Kashi had made a selection of his poems comprising 590 verses for inclusion in his *Tazkira*²⁶, but unfortunately the Manchester Catalogue does not contain this. Presumably this was never done by Taqi Kashi himself.

19. *Khulasat al s'Ah'ar* f. 484 a.

20. See *Khuld-i-Barin*, IV, f. 315 b, Cambridge G. 14 (15), *Alam Ara-yi-'Abbasi* Bib. Lind No. 915 *Akbar Nama* supports Kashi account, though it does not contain all those details (*A. N.*, III, 1236-37).

21. *Op. cit* ; f. 483 a. See also Beale's *Or. Biog. Dic.* p. 269.

22. See *Zakhira*, p. 122 ; *M. U. Tr.* I 62.

23. *Ibid*, See also *Maqalat ash-Shu'ara*, f. 520 b, Badayuni III, p. 366, *Tabaqat-i-Akbari* Tr. II 729 *Ma'asir* Tr. I 62.

24. Sprenger's MS says 10000. See also Beale p. 269.

25. See Badayuni III, 366-70, *Makhzan al Gharaib* f. 449 a. Bodlein No. 300.

26. *Khulasat al Ash'ar* f., 484a.

INTRODUCTION TO THE SITTANA CAMPAIGN

This despatch sent on the instructions of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab to Government of India, gives an account of the expedition undertaken by the British Government in late 1863, against the Muslim freedom fighters who had established themselves at Sittana and in the adjoining country. Sittana was situated in the narrow strip opposite Tonawal to the north of which was the town of Umb.

The movement was started by Sayyad Ahmad Shaheed who originally hailed from Bareilly. He had proclaimed a religious war against the Sikhs by rallying round himself the freedom loving tribes of the Frontier region. He succeeded against the Khans of Hoond and Hotee, defeated the Barakzais and occupied Umb and subsequently Peshawar. He levied tithe from the Yusafzais and also attempted to stop the Pathans from taking money on the betrothal of their daughters. These steps estranged the tribes from him and he had to leave Peshawar. Sayyad Ahmad Shah was however killed in the battle which he fought at Balakot against the Sikh General Sher Singh in 1830. The movement, initiated by him, however, continued, and his followers retired to Sittana and continued the freedom fight in the face of odds with a dedication to their ideal unexampled in the history of Freedom movement in the sub-continent.

At the particular time the British expedition was undertaken, the freedom fighters were not actually arrayed against the British, but their activities were mainly directed to the consolidation of their ranks to regain their lost initiative in the struggle. The Britishers who had become cognizant of the danger decided to undertake this expedition to extirpate them. However since the activities of the Mujahideen were confined mainly to the Azad territory and did not apparently to benefit the British interests, there could be a justification for the campaign. They were, however considered a serious danger to the future position of the British government not only on the Frontier but also a permanent source of danger to British rule in India. The real object was to drive them away from strongholds and to exact guarantees from Jaduns and Utmanzais tribes and thus consolidate their hold on this perennially disturbed area. The Governor-General was at first hesitant to permit the expedition. An excuse was however found in certain trivial incidents such as, that the Mujahideen had inspired an attack in 1857 on the territory of the British feudatory Jehandad Khan of Umb, committed two murders in 1863, had again

attacked Umb outpost at Shoongle in the Black Mountain and the levies of Madad Khan of Tanawal, killing several persons in September, 1863, and further that the Sayyads and Hindustanis had fired across the Indus at the British levies, and had also made a night attack on a British Assistant Commissioner.

The Britishers ultimately succeeded in their purpose not so much on the battlefield by the strength of their arms, but solely by seducing some of the Mujahideen's followers and working against the Mujahideen through the local chiefs. They got considerable support from local levies and made them fight against their own countrymen and co-religionists.

In spite of biased version of the struggle as given in the despatch, the true aim and character of the freedom fighters who were dubbed as Hindustanee fanatics would not be difficult to comprehend. They were, with the exception of the Sayyads of Sittana and others local tribes, people from the remotest corners of India who had given up their all worldly belongings, severed all family ties and fought the unequal contest. They were devout Muslims and their sole aim was to win back lost freedom for the Muslims. For the Britishers they were certainly fanatics and rebels who lost in the long run. Had they won, it would have been a glorious revolution and they would have been remembered as great patriots. Not only this, the history of this country would have been different; only they lost, laying down their lives—the only thing which they could call their own. They lost because they were abandoned and betrayed by their own countrymen on whom they had so much depended. It is a sad interlude in the fight for freedom, yet it is a glorious one too. These martyrs kindled the fire of freedom and it is on account of that that freedom is ours today. They not only planted the tree which has borne fruit but reared it with their blood. Freedom thrives on human blood and plenty of it was shed for our sake. Noble souls! We adorn them and we adorn the land, where they laid down their precious lives.

Apart from the actual operations we get a glimpse into the political life of the people of this area. They were divided into different factions and the majority was devoid of any sense of nationality so that for personal and selfish ends, and to gain an upper hand against their adversaries and opponents they became an easy prey to the outside influences and intrigues. The British were aware of this weakness and fully exploited it.

No. 67 of 1st February 1864

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT,
CALCUTTA.

I am directed, by the H. the LG, to submit the following report concerning the expedition recently undertaken against the Hindustanee fanatical Muhammadans of Sittana.

2. To save reference to former correspondence a short account will be given of this colony.

Syed Ahmad Shah the founder was a native of Bareilly. At one period of his life he was the companion-in-arms of the celebrated *Ameer Khan Pindaree*¹ who was himself a Pathan born in the valley of *Bonair*². The Sayed's daughters were married in *Tonk* and a son also still resides there. Syed Ahmed afterwards studied Arabic at Delhi and then proceeded to Mecca by way of Calcutta. It was during this journey that his doctrines obtained the ascendancy over the minds of the Muhammadans of Bengal, which has ever since led them to supply the colony at Sittana with fresh recruits. Although the Syed in after life attempted to disguise the fact, his doctrines were essentially those of the Wahabi sect inculcating the original tenets of Islam, and repudiating commentaries on the Koran, the adoration of relics, etc. It was in 1824 that the adventurer arrived by way of Kandahar and Kabul amongst the Yusafzai tribes on the Peshawar border. He proclaimed a religious war against the Sikhs and uniting with the *Barukzai Sirdars*³ then in possession of Peshawar, attacked the Sikh entrenched camp at Saidu but was defeated. He fled by *Loondkhur*⁴ to Swat, and then took up his residence with *Fatteh Khan of Panjar*⁵. This connection strengthened his position amongst the Pathans. He subdued the Khans of *Hoond and Hotee*⁶ and levied Tythes from the *Yusufzai clan*⁷. In 1828 by a night attack he defeated the *Barakzai* force which had advanced against him as far as *Taqah*. Subsequently he took possession of *Umb*⁸. In 1829 having again defeated the *Barukzais* at *Hotee* he occupied Peshawar. But his successful career was now brought to a close. His exactions had become oppressivs to the Pathans, and an attempt on his part to put a stop to their taking money on the bethrothal of their daughters was still more distasteful. There was a general insurrection

against him ; many of his followers including the deputy left at Peshawar were massacred and he himself forced to flee to *Paklee*⁹ in Hazara. There his followers again rallied round him but in 1830 they were completely defeated by a force under Sher Singh and the Syed himself was slain.

3. Of his disciples who escaped with their lives a portion found their way to Sittana. This village then belonged to *Syed Akbar Shah*¹⁰. For tribal reasons it had some years before been made a neutral village and conferred on his grandfather, *Zamia Shah*, a refugee from *Taktabund* in *Bonair*. *Syed Akbar* had served as Treasurer and counsellor of *Syed Ahmad* and on this account he willingly allowed the Hindustanees to gather round him. After the British annexation of Peshawar, the *Akhund Abdul Ghafur* of Swat prevailed on the people of that valley to receive *Syed Akbar* as their king, in order that in the event of an invasion they might attain to the joys of martyrdom. He died in 1857.

4. Although the Hindustanees were known to have aided the *Hussunzais*¹² in their attack on the territory of our feudatory *Jehandad Khan*¹³ of Umb in 1857, and there was good reason for believing that supplies of men and money reached them from Hindustan, we had no actual collision with them until April, 1858, when the force noted in the margin under Sir Sydney Cotton went against them. The son of the *Fateh Khan* abovementioned named *Moharoor Khan* had previously invited the fanatics to *Panjtar*, and *Munghal Thanah*¹⁴, and an Asst. Commr. encamped near the border had been attacked at night.

5. The results of the expedition were that the buildings at Sittana, *Panjtar*, *Chenglai*¹⁵, and *Munghal Thanah* were thrown down, the Hindustanee expelled, and engagements taken from the *Otmanzai*¹⁶ and *Judoon*¹⁷ tribes not to allow them to occupy Sittana.

6. They resettled at *Mulka*¹⁸ on the north side of the great *Mahaban* mountain. But in 1861 they came down to a place named *Sirree*¹⁹, just over-hanging their old haunt at Sittana, and commenced sending robbers into Hazara to carry off Hindu Banees, and it was not until an embargo was placed on the *Otmanzai* and *Judoon* tribes, that they returned to *Mulkah*.

7. In 1862 it was reported that the numbers of the Hindustanees had been increased, and several robberies having been committed by

robbers despatched by Mobarik Shah (son of Akbar Shah) into the Hazara territory, it was recommended that an expedition should be undertaken against Mulkah.

8. This recommendation accorded with the opinion of Major James, Commr. of Peshawar then absent in England, and of the Rt. Hon'ble the Secretary of State for India who in his despatch No. 18 of the 7th April, 1862 wrote as follows :—

“I am disposed to agree with the Commr. of Peshawar that it will eventually be necessary to expel the offender by force of arms and that they will be lasting source of trouble so long as they are permitted to remain in the neighbourhood”.

9. The Supreme Government were of opinion that sufficient cause for undertaking an expedition had not been shown.

10. During the autumn of 1862 and ensuing cold season not a single case of robbery was committed by the bandits retained by Syed Mobarik Shah. But in the spring of 1863 two murders generally attributed to them occurred.

11. On the 5th of July it was reported that the Syeds and Hindustanees had suddenly reoccupied Sittana. No attempt to prevent their coming was made by the Judoon and Otmanzai tribe, and some of the members actually invited them. The Syeds and Hindustanees also sent threatening messages to the Chief of Umb a feudatory protected by the British Government. Military measure were taken for maintaining a blockade against the Jadoon and Otmanzai tribes, and militia were entertained for the purpose of protecting the territory of the Umb Chief.

12. On the 7th of September the chief *Mouluee Abdoola*²⁰ of the Hindustanees attempted a night attack on the camp of the Guide Corps at *Topee*²¹, but this completely failed through the appearance of a patrol of that Regiment consisting of Daffadar and four men.

13. About the middle of September the Hussainzais attacked the *Shoongle* hamlets²² in the Black Mountain, where one of the Umb outposts was placed. One man was killed in the affair. Again in September the same tribe attacked the levies of *Mudad Khan of Tanawal*,²³ killing a jemadar and six of seven men.

14. The animus of the Syads and Hindustanees was further shown by their firing across the Indus at our levy picket at *Nowa Giran*, and by a letter addressed by Moulvee Abdoola to the Umb chief declaring war against the infidel and summoning all good Mussalmans to join them.

15. It here may be stated how the country thus disturbed by the Hindustanees is occupied and divided.

It is separated into two parts by the upper Indus which here runs nearly due south. On the left bank is the greater part of Tanawal canton held by the Umb Chief. North of this is the Black Mountain, the southern half of which is occupied by the Hussainzais, and the northern by the Akazais³⁴; and further eastward from the river, joining the Hussainzais is the petty chiefship of *Agrore*³⁵, subject to the British, and forming like Tanawal, part of the Hazara district. The portion on the right bank is bounded on the North by the Gurroo Range, dividing it from *Bonair*, and by the *Borendoo*³⁶ river separating it from the *Chigurzais*²⁷ and from the Trans-Indus Hussanzais; on the East by the Indus itself and on the south and West by the plains of Yusafzais.

16. The Otmanzais occupy a narrow strip opposite the Tanawal canton, which contains the villages of *Khubbule*²⁸ Sittana and *Mundee*²⁹. To the north is the town of Umb which stands on the river bank and the Trans Indus lands of Tanawal; and North of this is again the country of the *Mudda Kheyl*³⁰.

17. Within this line is the great Mahabun Mountain, the southern slopes of which are peopled by the Judoons, the northern and eastern by the *Amazais*³¹, west of the Indus are the *Khoodo Kheyl*³² by a lofty prolongation of the Mahabun reaching the Yusufzai border. The *Chumla valley*³³ is occupied by mixed tribes amongst whom the Amazais are most numerous. Col. Taylor's map accompanying shows roughly the respective limits of each tribe.

18. The numbers of fighting men respectively is thus estimated:

Hussanzais	...	2000
Akazais	...	1000
Chigurzais	...	12000
Mudda Khel	...	4000
Amazais	...	1500
Judoons	...	4000
Khoodoo Kheel	...	2000

19. The situation of Umb across the river renders it difficult of defence. The Chief was exposed not only to the threats and interdicts of the Syads, but to the hostility of the Hassunzais who have never forgiven the arrest of the their tribesmen by the Chief's father for their murder of one of our European Salt Collectors, and of the Chief of *Agrore*, a personal enemy, who by his marriage with the daughter of the Chief *Hussan Ali*³⁴, is connected with the Hassunzais. The Mudda Kheyl are also little friendly to Umb, but the Amazais are well disposed towards him.

20. Reports of the conduct of the Syads and Hindustanees being submitted to the Viceroy, H. E. called for a confidential report on the necessity of having resorted to military operations, on the receipt of which, H. E. by your despatch No. 639 dated 24th Sept. sanctioned the expedition.

21. In this despatch it was stated that the first object of the expedition was the clearance of the fanatics from the compact area of the Eurrendo to the North, the Indus to the East, and our Yusafzai frontier to the South and South-west. The exaction of guarantee from the Judoons, Otmanzais and other tribes was regarded as of secondary importance. Operations against the Hassunzais are made contingent on those against the fanatics being completed early in the winter, and it was ordered that the *Agrore* Chief should be called to account and made to furnish guarantees for his future conduct.

22. The Lt. Governor here desires to express his opinion that the operations thus sanctioned, against the fanatics were just and necessary. His Honour considers that it would have endangered our future position on the frontier, and we tamely submitted to the return of the fanatics to Sittana after having for so many years insisted on their abandoning it, or failed to avail ourselves of the opportunity afforded by their conduct to effect their punishment or extirpation. His Honour further believes that on this point there is no difference of opinion amongst officers acquainted with the Muhammadan frontier.

23. Your despatch defined the exact scope of the operations to be undertaken.

24. Col. Taylor's proposal was that the force should march to the head of the Judoon country either direct from Topee via *Besuk*³⁵

etc. or by following the route of the expedition of 1858 to Mangal Thanah and from thence working across, and should be met near Sittana by a column advancing up the right bank of the Indus crossing at *Korgarh*.

25. His Honour had suggested generally that the force should march in two columns and sweep the country either side of the Mahabun range mounting its heights and thence dictating terms to the tribes.

26. Your despatch, however, laid down that "While occupying the attention of the fanatics and their allies on the line of the Indus in the neighbourhood of Sittana, the aim should be, if there be no military objections to this course, to push up a strong column to Mangal Thanah and Mulkah so as to interpose between the fanatics and their line of retreat towards the Burrendō, their posts on a kick might be occupied either by a separate light column or by a detachment from the main column. The latter would, from Mangal Thanah and Mulkah, then operate, in conjunction with our troops on the Indus line, against the fanatics; and their dispersion would under such circumstance be on lines of direction favourable to their capture if the co-operation of the well-disposed sections of the tribes could be elicited".

27. In the despatch of the Secy. to the Government of India, Mily. Dept. Para. 2 to the Adjt. Gen. it was added that the strength and composition of each column and the routes to be followed can probably best be fixed by the Genl. Officer Commanding the troops in consultation with the Commr. accompanying the Force.

28. Col. Taylor, in his Report now forwarded, notes that under the above orders his original plan was extended first by the direction to destroy the outposts of the Hindustanees in the northern extremity of the Chumba valley, and secondly by the injunction to take guarantees for their future conduct from the Amazai Mudda Kheyil tribes.

29. It was arranged that the advance of the expedition should be made as soon after the 10th Oct. as possible, in order to leave a clear month for the operations before snow might be expected to fall.

30. On the 27th Sept. Col. Wilde Commanding the Guide Corps under whose directions the blockade against the Judoons had been conducted submitted a memorandum through Bridr.-Genl. Sir Neville Chamberlain, a copy of which is appended.

31. In this document Col. Wilde advocated that instead of taking the route followed by the expedition of 1858, viz., from *Swabee-Maaree*³⁶ through the Khoodoo Kheyl country to Mangal Thanah, one strong column should be formed having its base at "*Rooastm ka Bazar*"³⁷ in the Sudhoom valley, and a second weak one having its base at Kirplian on the left bank of the Indus nearly opposite Umb : the first column to be assembled at Swabee-Maneree, so as to leave the enemy under the belief, generally entertained, that it would advance by Mangal Thanah, but actually to march through *Umbeyle*³⁸ (or more correctly the *Soorkhawee*) defile and occupy the village of Kogah, and the next day of Cherorai ; the Hazara column simultaneously with the occupation of *Cherora*³⁹ dropping down the Indus, and driving the enemy out of Sittanr. The first column was to march on the third day to Malkah. Further movements were to be guided by circumstances and enquiry. The advantages of this route were thus reckoned.

I. That the Judoons finding their country commanded by the Force in the Chumla valley would keep quiet and perhaps assist in capturing the defeated Hindostanees. Valley containing several fine villages and admitting of the employment of cavalry ; when also, flying columns could be sent by the Mahabun, the Northern slopes of which are easier than the Southern.

II. It afforded the alternatives either of withdrawing to the plains through the Umbeylah Pass, or of sending back the cavalry by that route and advancing the rest of the force either of Mangal Thanah or Sittana at night be found feasible.

32. To this paper Col. Wilde appended certain questions which he referred for the determination of the Commissioner Colonel Taylor. They include the following :—

Will the *Panairwala*⁴⁰ cross the Garroo range to attack the British camp in the Chamla Valley ?

Is the Umbeylah pass easy of access ?

Is the Chamla plain large and well adapted for military operations ?

Can communication be opened from Cheroral with the Hazara District ?

33. In paras 14 to 43 of his Report Col. Taylor explains the means which he had of relying to these and other enquiries. The Lt.-Govern-

nor would solicit an attentive consideration of the circumstances therein represented.

34. It is shown that Col. Taylor on account of the advantage of communicating personally with General Chamberlain remained at Murree until the 3rd of Oct. and on the 7th arrived at the upper Indus and took sketches of the river board from Bultheree below Sittana to the junction of the Barrendo which demonstrated the impracticability of bringing the force direct from Cherorai to the Indus. Col. Taylor regarded this point as the most important left for his determination, as if the route had been practicable, there might have been no occasion to keep up communications with the rear, and the effect of a force marching right through a country is much greater than when it retires by the line of its advance; and in the present case it was of more importance as bringing the force close to the Hassanzais whom it was proposed to deal with if time allowed.

Col. Taylor reached the Camp at Swabee on the 12th. In the meantime he had sent Captain Munro Dy. Commr. of Peshawar thither on the 7th. His Assistant Lt. Sandeman, and Extra Asst. *Atta Mahmed Khan* had long been employed in studying the routes into the hills and amongst them that by the Umbeylah Pass. Agreeably to Col. Wilde's conviction—(and it must be remembered that this was founded on the local knowledge always available to the Commandant of the Guides) it was reported that "the Umbeylah pass was easy as to roadway, and presented no military obstacles, that the Chamla valley was wide and open, and the Northern slopes of the Mahabun easier than on the Southern face". Enquiries made by Col. Taylor himself at the head of the Tanawal country on the left bank of the Indus confirmed the two latter points, and in a reconnaissance to Punjar verified his opinions. This information was not actually incorrect. The pass was open to camels and the ordinary road for the traffic from the Chamla valley. The error lay in the informants being unable to judge of its fitness for the carriage with which the force was furnished.

35. He was precluded from making any direct enquiries concerning the Soorkhabee pass. One part of the plan was to leave the enemy in ignorance that this route would be taken, so as to take them by surprise and prevent their assembling in the pass, and investigations regarding it made at that late time would have aroused suspicion.

36. The other routes he knew to be at least as bad as this one. He observes that—"It appears at the time of suffice that the Chamla Plain could not be above ten miles from our own *Suddhoom valley*⁴¹ and that the road that intervened was known to be one of general traffic, and was reported commonly in the country as open and easy. In front of our camp as Swabbe stood up before us the great unbroken backbone ridge of the Mahabun mountain, with rough steep spurs descending towards the plain, that difficult country must be entered somewhere—it was a prize to have found a route by which the whole could be turned and our task be accomplished by occupying country in which our troops would be so placed, that they would be as strong as on our own plains, and therefore, be able to deal with numerically vastly superior bodies of the Hill tribes."

If the full length and all the difficulties had been known before hand, such were its military advantages, that it would still have been adopted.

His Honour is of opinion that Col. Taylor, who is specially qualified both by his attainments and experience for this duty, did all that was possible under the existing circumstances of necessary haste and secrecy, to verify the practicability of the route for troops.

37. But after all it was as much the opposition of the Bonair tribe as the difficulty of the pass that led to the detention of the Force, and it has to be explained why we were unable to foresee this hostility.

38. Col. Taylor states that, during his two years, incumbency of the commr. ship of Peshawar, nothing had called his attention from more pressing affairs to this fact of the border. The Yusufzai clans, of the Bonair valley had never, during the past 13 years come into collision with the British power, and nearly all that was known of them was that numbering some 12,000 they had in former times sold their services in aid of the Mundan clans especially in the Loondkhar and Suddhoom valleys: but had never crossed over as invaders, and that numerous *Paracha* merchants settled in the valley were in the habit of trading with our villages by the camel way of the *Mullendary Pass*.⁴² Again, little was on record concerning the Chamla valley save that it was inhabited by 4000 persons of intermixed Mundun clans.

39. Neither Col. Wilde nor Col. Taylor anticipated open opposition from the Bonair tribe. Col. Taylor explains why he deemed it improbable.

“The Chumla valley was not claimed by or considered as under the protection of any large clan; it was known to be divided from Bonair by a lofty range of mountains called the Gurroo. The Bonair people had no sympathy as a body with the fanatics being of different tenets and forming part of the religious constituency of the Akhoond of Swat, who was known to be bitterly opposed at the time to the fanatic body, the members of which he denounced as Wahabis *coupling* them with his especial rival the Kotah Moolah⁴³ whom, with his disciples he had not scrupled to stigmatise as *Kaffirs*, i.e., infidels, for certain heterodox theories opposed to his, the Akhoond rulings in matters affecting the Muhammadan Faith. It was indeed known that the Sittana Fanatics had on several occasions paraded detachments of men with standards, etc., from Bonair, but small importance was attached to the fact, as it was known to be their custom to purchase the services of idle tribesmen, to parade them for their own purposes, and had it been supposed that men had really been sent as auxiliaries by a portion of the tribe it would have been considered that they must belong to the *Kotah Moolah's* faction and therefore be acting contrary to the general sense and politics of the tribe”.

40. The absolute necessity for secrecy prevented any consultation with the Bonair Jirgah or Council. It prevented also any interrogation of the Suddhoom Khans, who might perhaps have been able to have predicted the course of action which the tribe would take.

41. Still Colonel Taylor expresses his doubt whether had it been known beforehand that the Bonair population would certainly take part against our force, even then the route by the Umbeylah pass would have been rejected, for it promised paramount military advantages and a position in the valley, affording equal opportunities either for defeating their attacks or for assuring them of our friendly intentions towards them. It will be seen from Col. Wilde's letter appended that that

officer is under the impression that the Bonair tribe was much more under the influence of the fanatics than is commonly supposed, and would have aided them by whatever route our advance was made.

42. Brigadier-General Sir Neville Chamberlain writing on the 18th October to the Adjutant-General in allusion to the Bonair Amazai and neighbouring tribes said :

“ If any of these tribes should prove hostile or the whole should choose to unite against us, the force which enters the hills will, I confidently believe, be found strong enough to hold its own against any tribe or combination of tribes which may endeavour to oppose it ”.

43. A detail of the Force employed on the expedition is given in the margin, together with that posted on the line of the Indus.

Details of troops employed,

	<i>Eur.</i>	<i>Nat.</i>	<i>Total.</i>
Arty	50	230	280
Cavy	200	200
Infantry	1100	4050	5150
	<u>1600</u>	<u>4480</u>	<u>5630 & 13 guns.</u>

With the commr. there was also 1000 Levies of the armed men of the country who were used in guarding the rear communications. The following troops held the line of the Indus, Hazara and Yusufzai :

Darband.⁴⁴	350 European Infantry. 250 N. I. 3 guns.
Tarbela.	1 squadron of N. Cavy. Details of N. I.
Topee.	150 N. Cavy. 250 N. I. 2 guns.
Abbotabad.	1 Co. of European infy. Depots of 2 Regts. N. I. 50 N. Cavy. and 3 guns.
Rostum Bazar.	300 N. Cavy. Details of N. I.
Mardan.	Depot of Guide Corps.

44. The Commander-in-Chief had been informed by the Govt. of India that the Lt.-Governor would assist in the collection of carriages

and accordingly through the agency of the District Officers about 4000 mules, ponies and other beasts of burden were assembled in addition to the permanent equipage.

45. To form the expeditionary force all the Northern Military Stations were drawn upon to such an extent that no Reserve could be maintained nearer than Lahore.

46. The following details will show the number of troops left at each station :

Peshawar.	Besides several batteries of Arty. 1 Regt. of Hussars. 1 Regt. of Eur. Infantry. 2 Regts. of Bengal Cavy. 3 Regts. of N. I. all weak. Ineffective men and having to hold outposts which took up one Regt.
Rawalpindi.	1 Regt. of N. I. out of which 120 men were at Murree. 1 Batty. of Arty. 1 Co. of 93rd Highldr. Depots of 51st and 101st.
Abbotabad.	3 guns. 1 Co. of 93rd Highldrs. Depots 5th Ghoorkhas 1st P. I. 30 N. Cavy.
Kohat.	2 guns Punjab Battery. 2 Squardons N. Cavy. 2 weak Regts. P. I.
Bunnoo.	2 guns P. Battery. 1 Regt. P. Cavy. 1 Regt. P. Infy.
Dera Ismail Khan.	2 guns P. Battery, 1 Regt. P. Cavalry. 1 Regt. P. Infantry.

47. Proclamations of which copies are appended to Col. Taylor's report, separately addressed to the tribes concerned were issued. The Judoon Jirgah came into and remained in our camp throughout the hostilities. The people of the Chumla valley afforded supplies when not afraid of the others. The Bonair, Amazai and Mudda Kheyl tribes all took part against us.

48. On 18th October the expeditionary force moved from Swabee to Nuwakilla a point being simultaneously made towards the *Durrum Pass* to mask the real line of advance.

49. At 9 p.m. on the 19th a column under Col. Wilde accompanied by Col. Taylor advanced from *Nuwakilla*⁴⁵ and reached the mouth of the Soorkhawes defile where it halted for the dawn. It was then seen that the roadway was in parts overgrown with brush wood and overhung by trees.

50. Col. Wilde's column arrived at the crest of the Pass at 4 p.m. on the 20th experiencing a slight opposition easily overcome from a few of the Bonair tribe. Genl. Chamberlain with the rest of the Force arrived at dusk on the same day.

51. On the 21st Genl. Chamberlain telegraphed to the Lt.-Governor that the pass "was much longer, more difficult than was anticipated and that the Bonair tribe had assembled but it was hoped would not act against us.

52. And again on the 22nd as follows :

"The Force had to halt to allow baggage, supplies and rear guard to come up. Roadway bad. Carriage and drivers inefficient. Hopes the Force will be able to move into the Chumla valley tomorrow, but it cannot reach incomplete. The Bonair tribe still assembled at mouth of their own pass, while penetrates the Gurroo range, and faces Umbeylah on the left of our line of march. They are doubtful of our designs and apprehension has been created in their minds by the fanatics."

53. On the 23rd occurred the reconnaissance of the Chumla valley by Col. Alexander Taylor C. B. whose detachment was attached when returning by the Bonair tribe.

54. This event caused General Chamberlain to telegraph that "the

Bonair tribe having acted against us threaten our line of communication with Roostam, To enable us to maintain the pass or operate in the direction intended it will be necessary to hold the pass in strength, I have ordered up the wing of the Ferozepur Regt. from Nuwakilla to Roostum. Another Native Infantry Regt. must be given from Peshawar should be sent to Roostum at once. More native infantry may yet be necessary to secure our present line of communication”.

55. Here it must be noted that the Governor-General being in Thibet and the Commr. in Chief also in the *interior* on the hills, the Lt.-Govr. to save time was obliged to take upon himself the duty of attending General Chamberlain's requisitions.

56. It has been shown above that the troops at Rawalpindi and in the Peshawar valley had been much reduced; nevertheless His Honour at once requested the General Commr. at Peshawar to send another Native Regt. to the Umbeylah Pass. Accordingly the 4th Goorkhas joined General Chamberlain on the 29th.

57. It is unnecessary here to recount the combat in which the force was engaged, but it should be mentioned that the Bonair tribe were joined on the 25th by *Mobarak Shah*⁴⁶ and the Hindustanees and on the 26th by the Akhoond of Swat.

58. The charge thus occasioned in the work to be performed will be understood from General Chamberlain's telegram of the 27th.

“All goes well and I entertain no fear as to final result, if supported by more infantry and kept in supplies and ammunition. Tribes losing men and will tire first. The Akhoond of Swat having joined collation is serious, because his influence extends as far as Kohat and other tribes may take it up fanatically. I recommended your sending Trans-Indus as many troops as can be spared from below. Any backwardness now may cause great inconvenience whereas if the tribes hear of the arrival of troops, those tribes not committed are likely to keep quiet”.

59. The Akhond and an ascetic named Abdool Ghafoor who has long had great spiritual ascendancy of the Yusufzai clans, and who is regarded with reverence by the Pathans generally. He is stated by Major James to owe much of his influence to his keeping up the fear of an invasion of the valley by the British.

60. It had been hitherto understood that antagonism of the Akhund, and their union in a common cause, touching the religion of so large a population without and within our frontier, and also of a portion of our native troops, was not without a serious aspect. The Lt.-Govr. had previously in the absence of the Governor-General in the hills, considered the expediency of forming a Reserve near the Indus, and on the 28th in consultation with Colonels Norman and Duran the Military and Foreign Secretaries to the Government of India who had lately arrived at Lahore, he arranged for the forward march of the 93rd Highlanders from Sialkot and of the 23rd and 24th N. I. from Lahore. The presence of the two last Regiments at Lahore was a fortunate accident, as they were on escort duty with the Viceroy's camp. The troops at Meean Meer at this time were so few that there was difficulty in supplying a guard of 24 Bayonets for the Lt.-Govr.

61. At the same time His Honour was keenly sensible that if there were danger in the religious combination which had occurred, it would be greatly increased if a temporary appearance of success and triumph were given to it by the long detention of our force on the defensive, and that the absence of this large force from the Peshawar valley at a time of danger both invited attack and diminished the means of repelling it.

62. His Honour therefore entertained the hope that General Chamberlain would speedily overcome the unexpected opposition with which he had been met at the Umbeylah Pass, and that he would without delay be able to proceed into the Chumla valley as had been planned. It was therefore not originally intended that the Brigade from Lahore should join Genl. Chamberlain's force but should serve as a support to it on the plains.

63. But General Chamberlain found it impracticable to move into the Chumla valley, with the formidable enemy now reinforced from Bajour, threatening his left flank and near communications.

64. Under these circumstances His Honour enquired on the 8th November if the Genl. on receiving a reinforcement of about 1600 infantry could advance with the object of destroying Mulkah.

65. Sir Neville Chamberlain replied on the 12th that "if the head of the pass should be held by 2000 infantry and some guns it would be practicable to move the force down to Umbeylah" but he depreciated

any advance on Mulkah until the Bonair tribe had been brought to terms which in due time he thought they could be.

66. About the 4th of November the Lt.-Govr. in consultation with Col. Norman agreed that the 7th Fusiliers, forming part of the escort with the Viceroy's camp, should march towards the frontier which it accordingly did on the 5th.

67. Foreseeing the demand that would arise for carriage suitable to the Hills His Honour at this time issued orders in the Military Department for its collection. And in all November and the beginning of December 4200 camels and 2100 mules, etc., were assembled from all parts of the Punjab province at Nowchahra.

68. In the absence of Native infantry a part of 200 Foot police and 75 Horse were sent to Nawakilla to aid in protecting the rear communications which had been threatened.

69. H. E. the C-in-C arrived at Lahore on the 14th November and from that time the Lt.-Govr. ceased to give any direct instructions concerning the movement of troops though he did not fail through Col. Norman to apprise H. E. of the sense which he entertained of the importance of reinforcing Genl. Chamberlain so as to enable him to make a forward move and of the great political danger of avoidable delay.

70. It will be observed from paras. 93, 94 and 95 of Colonel Taylor's report that that officer in agreement with General Chamberlain advocated in his letter of the 11th November that the Bonair tribe should be pressed until they consented to send away the Hindustanee; and that in order to do this an additional brigade should be sent to hold the crest of the pass whilst the force moved down to Umbeylah village threatening the Bonair pass, and compelling the tribe to fight or send away the Hindustanees. Col. Taylor's plan on the eve of the submission of the Bonairwals was for our force to destroy Mulkah, accompanied by the Jirgah.

71. The Lt.-Governor on the 14th November recorded his strong opinion an operations which would entail upon us the necessity of entering the Bonair valley, or which would involve us in an extended and prolonged hill campaign. In these views His Honour was strongly supported by Supreme Govt. His Honour at the same time recommended

the additional Brigade being advanced to the Umbeylah pass, and justified Col. Taylor's proposal to press the Bonair tribe for they submitted in the end without their territory being visited.

72. The actual event and Colonel Taylor and General Chamberlain are entitled to applause on this occasion both for the constancy of their designs and the correctness of their judgments.

73. His Honour previous to the receipt of Colonel Taylor's letter was not assured that the Bonair tribe would consent to send away the Hindustanees. He still doubts if they would have done so, had their losses not been so severe and our victory so complete. The state of matters up to the 21st of November much increased these doubts: and in fact it was not until our force drove the enemy from *Laloo*⁴⁷ and Umbeylah on the 15th and 16th December that the tribe felt themselves at liberty to separate from the confederacy and to make their submission. When the Lt.-Govr. discussed the subject on the first occurrence of this check he was far from imagining that the force would so long remain stationary, and it was his sense of the political risk involved in this attitude that led him to object to negotiation with the tribe. No doubt when the reinforcements reached and active measures were taken the Bonairwals could be pressed to agree to send away the Hindustanees or to any other condition.

74. In paras. 96—112 Colonel Taylor investigated the question as to whether an adherence to the route suggested by the Government of India would have avoided collision with the Bonair tribe. He points out that the Moulvee had previously by letter (copy of which is annexed) invited the Bonair chiefs to occupy the *Tarputtee*⁴⁸ and Chingulee passes from the Khoodoo Khail country, and that it is possible they might have done so and thereby threatened our advance towards Mulka. He further dwells on the physical difficulties to be overcome in crossing the Mahabun and in case of a check on the possible combination of the Northern tribes, Hussanzais, Chighurzais, Mudda Kheyl, Amazais, etc., which would have been formed against us at a long distance from our own territory. On the whole however he thinks that we should have succeeded in advancing to Mulkah by this route. But then the instructions of the Governments of India required in addition the destruction of the Hindustanee outposts at *Nawagiri* and *Mukhrung* in the Chumla valley. This would have taken the force into the open plain past *Kooria*⁴⁹,

and Col. Taylor is of opinion that its appearance there would have alarmed the Bonair tribe and brought them upon us, and he thinks it was better that we met them at the Umbeylah pass with our own country so close in rear. Lastly, he regards the results which accrued in the defeat of the confederation of tribes urged on by their religious leaders as more likely to give us permanent peace than if our operations had been on a smaller scale.

75. The Lt.-Govr. is disposed to regard as sound these opinions, which come with weight from Colonel Taylor on account both of his scrupulous candour and also of his special aptitude in judging of grounds from a military point of view. His Honour is himself convinced that the advantages promised by the selection of the Soorkhawee route were real and substantiated and that in the end they were fully attained. The delay in the arrival of the baggage on the crest and the opportunity of attack afforded to the Bonair tribe of the Force in a very extended position were accidents to which expeditions into mountains must occasionally be liable and liability to which in this instance increased by the short time allowed for preparation and the large amount of baggage caused by the presence of European troops.

76. The time fixed for the expedition was that of harvest and when forage for cattle is most easily procurable. It has been usual to choose season for such operations as the hill people fearing for their crops are then more amenable to our demands.

77. To supplement the camels which are always the great standby and to furnish mule carriage it has been explained that the district officers had used every exertion. The number of animals collected was more than sufficient, for some were sent direct here through pass yet amongst so many hurriedly assembled there must have some weakly animals, but no complaint on this subject was made previous to the advance and no officer had greater experience of the carriage most needed or paid more attention to this important point than Genl. Chamberlain. It is explained by Col. Taylor that owing to the presence of brushwood and large boulders in the roadway loads were knocked off the unless hacks or thrown down by animals unfit to take them up again. As night came on, the stores needed for the Europeans had to be brought up out of order, and a stoppage of the line occurred. The pass at its head was so narrow that only one animal could make its way at a time. All the

baggage was not up until the 24th October. On the previous day occurred the junction of the Hindustanees with the tribe and the General had asked for more Native infantry.

78. From that time character of the operations was changed. The sudden march projected over the pass into the open valley had failed and the defence of a very extended position in the hills had to be undertaken.

79. Col. Taylor has pointed out that if the original plan had been carried out and our force had gained *Kogah*⁵⁰ even then if the Bonair tribe had persisted in hostility our communications and any small force left to hold the crest might have been jeopardised. Still it is not impossible that a bold move down to Umbeylah threatening the tribe to pass into Bonair might have frightened the tribe into submission and opened their mind to our explanations. But much risk would have attended the failure of such an operation.

80. The Supreme Govt. had repeated their instructions that the operations should not be extended beyond the area originally contemplated and that they should be completed about the 15th November.

81. On the 14th of that month the Lt.-Govr. reviewed the situation in the letter marginally noted and (as was before mentioned) recommended that an additional Brigade of 1500 men should be sent to Genl. Chamberlain to enable him to move down to Umbeylah and act on the offensive against the Bonairwals. It was calculated that this reinforcement could reach in about 15 days. 700 additional mules had already been collected near Rawalpindi and it was hoped that the district officers would be able to raise the number of 2000 within the time specified. Col. Norman on the part of the Supreme Govt. instructed to C.-in-C. to despatch the Brigade—the means of forming which as previously stated had already been advanced from Lahore.

82. But Genl. Chamberlain's telegram of the 19th showed a state of things which gave rise to serious apprehensions in the mind of the Lt.-Govr. concerning the position of the Force during the days which must elapse before the Brigade could reach it.

83. The telegrams reported that on the morning of the 18th the position in the Soorkhabee pass had been relinquished for a better one

in which the troops were more concentrated and communicating with the plains by the *Sherdunah Pass*⁵¹ that the enemy on learning this movement attacked in force taking one of our pickets and killing 4 officers and 45 men and wounding 69. The telegram concluded as follows :

“The troops have now been hard worked both day and night for a month and having to meet fresh enemies which loss is telling. We much need reinforcements. I find it difficult to meet the enemy’s attacks and provide convoys for supplies and wounded sent to the rear. If you can give some fresh corps to relieve those most reduced in numbers and the relieved corps can be sent to the plains and used in support. This is urgent”.

84. On the 20th the Genl. reported that he had 452 sick and wounded for whose removal to Permulu he was arranging.

85. On the 20th also Major James (who having returned from England resumed charge of the Commander-ship of Peshawar from Col. Taylor) reported an attack at noon on that day in which we again lost a picket subsequently retaken together with two officers and 128 men killed and wounded.

On this occasion General Chamberlain was severely wounded on the wrist.

86. The Lt. - Govr. consulted with Col. Norman who recorded his opinion that under all the circumstances the Force ought to be withdrawn to the plains, and as the Lt. Govr. concurred with this experienced officer (who had, from the office which he holds, the best available means of knowing to what extent and in what time reinforcements could be furnished) in thinking that there was no adequate object in view requiring the continued exposure of the Force under such disadvantages to repeated attacks which it could not meet on the offensive and to great loss of men—His Honour telegraphed to Major James detailing the then position of the advancing Regiments that they could not all reach under twelve days and that no further reinforcements could be sent without great delay—that any disaster to Genl. Chamberlain’s force would by all means to be avoided—and that the Lt. - Govr. no longer insisted on the General advancing for the purpose of attaining the object of the expedition but authorised the withdrawal of the force to *Permulu*⁵², if on military grounds be deemed it advisable. It was designed

that in the event of the force withdrawing it should again advance into the Jadoon country.

His Honour considered that under circumstances the Military Commr. should be left free to act solely according to the military necessities of the case without regard to political considerations and feelings that Genl. Chamberlain's moral position, in the event of there being a necessity for the retirement of the force, would be fortified by sanction to the measure being previously given by the Local Govt. His Honour did not hesitate to take the responsibility involved in this case on himself.

87. This precautionary measure happily proved unnecessary. On the 22nd Major James telegraphed to the effect that though the position was difficult he was confident of success, that the return of the force then would be a great calamity, and that the original object of the expedition could be accomplished. Genl. Chamberlain was also of opinion that there was no necessity for any retirement.

88. The attack of the enemy on the 20th proved their last.

89. On the 23rd, Wing of the 23rd N.I. reached camp with some European details.

90. It was considered significant of the depression of the enemy that no attack was made on the the 27th Friday—which day from superstitious motives was generally selected.

91. On the 28th having heard that the Govt. of India approved of the withdrawal of the force to the plains under the circumstances above represented, the Lt.-Govr. recorded a Minute showing that these had much improved, but still objecting to the stationary attitude of the force and urging some forward movement. But the obstacle to such a movement was that the reinforcements had not all yet reached the camp.

92. In the meantime Major James did what was possible by negotiations to weaken the enemy and with considerable success, due to some degree to the losses sustained by the confederacy. He says in his report, para 20—

"I succeeded in drawing off *Ahmad Khan*⁵³ with the greater portion of the *Asherzai*⁵⁴ and *Salarzai*⁵⁵ sections of the Bonair tribe. The *Asherzai*⁵⁶ were also induced to return their homes to the number of

2000, *Sohbat Khan*⁵⁷ of Swat also sent home his immediate followers. Minor personage acted in a similar manner, and amongst those who remained a mutual mistrust prevailed”.

93. Major James further states that, on the 25th he became convinced that the Bonairwals were really inclined for peace. But about this time the enemy were reinforced by the arrival of *Fazlulub Khan of Bajour*⁵⁸, with 3000 men, and of the *Haji of Koonhar*⁵⁹, an ascetic of note amongst the Hassunzais, with a following of 500.

94. It was now that misunderstanding occurred which led to some delay in the arrival of the long expected reinforcements. Major James had moved Col. Wilde to send a body of troops, chiefly Cavalry from Peshmouli, Mardan and Topee to overawe the people of Loondkhar in our territory, and induce the people to return to their homes, for they had secretly abetted the enemy. It was thought that it might also alarm the Swatees. Major James had previously considered the policy of making a demonstration against Swat, and had adjudged the scheme inexpedient. Unfortunately he omitted to communicate the opinion which he had formed on this measure to the Lt.-Governor who, therefore, when the Commd.-in-chief proposed to employ the 7th Fusiliers and 3rd Sikhs in making a feint on Swat, assented to the plan as well calculated to draw off the enemy and facilitate our advance whilst the troops still remained within a few marches of the Umbeylah Pass. But on Major James' representing that he had promised the Swat Chief that no movement should be made against them the Commd.-in-chief at once agreed to forego his plan.

95. By the 5th of December all the reinforcements were in camp.

96. The state of the frontier is thus represented by Major James :—

“The excitement was spreading far and wide. The *Mohmands*⁶⁰ on the Peshawar Border were beginning to make hostile demonstrations at *Shub Kuddur*⁶¹, for the first time since their signal defeat near the same place in 1852 by the late Lord *Clyde*—Rumours were also reaching me from Kohat of expected raids by the *Waziris*⁶² and *Oknankhail*⁶³, emissaries from Kabul and Jalalabad were with the Akhoond who had also been further reinforced by *Ghugaa Khan*⁶⁴ and chief of

*Dhir*⁶³ and 6000 men. On the 5th December the Mohmunds made a raid into our territory near Shub Kuddur.

This description sufficiently proves that the anxiety of the Lt.-Govr. as to the consequences of the long stationary position of our forces was not unfounded.

97. On the 5th, Major James in accordance with the constant instructions of the Lt.-Govr. urged Genl. Garvock in a written memorandum (to be found in para. 27 of his report) to attack Lallo and move on Umbeylah. And on a reference by Genl. Garvok the C.-in-C. directed that whilst a portion of the Force held the Umbeylah pass, the remainder should advance to Mulkah and return by the same route. On the 8th, Major James again addressed Genl. Garvock (Para. 31) strongly insisting on the advantage to be gained by the assumption of the initiative and by an *immediate* attack on Lalloo. But this was prevented at the time by some intermediate orders from the Supreme Govt. to the C.-in-C. It should be noted that by the arrival of the 93rd Highlanders, 7th Fusiliers, and two Native infantry Regiments, all of which it will be remembered had been moved up on the Lt.-Govr's suggestion, the force was now in a position to do anything being more than 9000 strong.

98. On the 10th the Bonair Jirgah suddenly came to Major James who is of opinion that they were sincere in their anxiety to agree to his terms. However, this may be, they failed in persuading their allies to make peace and Major James received information that the enemy contemplated an attack on our position on the 16th.

99. On Major James's application to the Lt.-Govr. he procured instructions from the Commr.-in-Chief authorizing Genl. Garvock to comply with his requisition provided he deemed them practicable in a military sense.

100. On the 14th Major James again addressed the General urging an immediate attack on Lalloo, where 4000 men including 300 Hindustanees were reported to be. Genl. Garvock assenting, the enemy were expelled from Lalloo on the 15th with a loss of 400 killed and wounded to our 40.

101. On the 16th the Force descended to burn the village of Umbeylah the enemy again losing 200 men.

102. Major James states that the Bonairwals proved the sincerity of their desire for peace by taking no prominent part in these actions.

103. The people from Bajour and Dher now fled. The Akoond and Swatees held themselves in readiness for flight. On the 17th the Bonairwals again presented themselves to Major James asking for orders.

104. Finding that it would take at least seven days before a strong Brigade could be sent to destroy Mulkah and fearing that during that interval fresh combination of the tribes might occur, Major James arranged that as soon as the Bonairwals had dismissed the Swatees, ect., from their Pass, and had given hostages of the whole of their Chiefmen they should in company with some selected British officers escorted by the Guide Corps, proceed to destroy Mulkah and to expel the Hindustanees from the Bonair, Chumlah and Amazai lands. By a generous and graceful concession Major James deputed Colonel Raynell Taylor, C.B., as the Political officer with the party.

105. The destruction of Mulka was completely effected and without resistance, though until the Bonairwals had talked to them, a party of the Amazai tribe appeared in an ambiguous attitude.

106. Major James was satisfied with the manner in which the work was performed and applauds Col. Taylor's conduct on the occasion.

107. The party returned to the Umbeylah pass on the 23rd and on the 25th the whole force had arrived at Nuwakilla in the plans. Not a shot being fired as it retired.

108. Under the circumstances represented, and the great disadvantages of delay, the Lt.-Governor entirely approved the decision of Major James not to await the action of our troops. His Honour also agrees with Major James in thinking that it was wise to make the Bonairwals perform a deal which the Hindustanees will not readily forgive.

109. In paras. 52—62 of his report Major James gives the particulars of his proceedings supported by a Brigade under Colonel Wilde of his dealings with the Judoon and Oknanzai tribes from whom he took fresh agreements.

110. In the month of January Major Coxe the Dy. Commr. procured the submission of the Mudda Kheyls and Amazai tribes and received their engagements not to harbour the Hindustanees.

111. Later he also received the submission of the Hussanzais with the exception of *Kabook Khan*⁶⁶ the son of the Chief. It is intended that they shall make reparation to the Umb Chief for the outrages against him.

112. Major James states that the number of the Hindustanees exceeded 900 and that half were killed or wounded ; of the remainder some in Swat and some in the Trans Indus Hussanzai country.

113. The Lt.-Governor desires to offer a few remarks regarding the events and affairs detailed in this report.

114. It is shown that whether there was previously between the Hindustanees and the tribes an alienation as Colonel Taylor and Major James report or a good understanding as Colonel Wilde suspects, this has at least been shown that their quarrel if any existed, was not irreconcilable. It has been proved that partly at least on their account a formidable combination of the tribes has been effected and that their counsels have had the ascendancy. It is therefore evident that this coalition might have taken place under other circumstances and that the religious war that they have so persistently preached might at some further time have been adopted by all the Frontier tribes. It must be inferred that the fanatics were not harmless or powerless religionists, but as they have been constantly represented by this Government as permanent source of danger to our rule in India, and that the policy by which their extirpation was designed was right and defensive. If anything could make their intrigues clearer it would be the recent discoveries in the Police Department by which they are shown to have had a regular machinery in the meat contractor's of our Commissariat Department for obtaining recruits and supplies from Hindustanees. It may be true that in ordinary times they can do little against us, but they serve to keep up a fanaticism which might otherwise die out and which in any general disturbance would be a rallying point against us.

115. *Secondly*, regarding the strength of the force employed, the following is a detail of the number of troops employed in the several

Hill Expeditions :

<i>Year.</i>	<i>Tribe against which undertaken.</i>	<i>No. of troops.</i>
1850	Appedees	3200
1851	Meeranzai	2050
1852	Momunds	700
1852	Ranzai	2000
1852	Osmanzai	2000
1852	Kaghan	850
1852	Omerzai Waziris	1500
1853	Hussunzais	850
1853	Theoranees	2800
1153	Kasranees	600
1853	Borce Appedees	1500
1854	Michnee Momunds	1600
1855	Meerazai	3700
1855	Roabeuh Kheyl Osukzai	2300
1856	Meeranzai	4550
1857	Bozdar	2640
1858	Sittana fanatics	4877
1859	Kabul Kheyl Waziris	3911
1861	Muhsood Waziris	5196
1863	Sittana fanatics and Bonair tribes	5620

It will be observed that the force on the present occasion was larger than on any former one. It was considered by all parties more than sufficiently numerous to deal with any opposition which it might meet, and was indeed as large as a force can conveniently be, which is to move about in the hilly country. The extended position in which it was attacked did not allow of its numbers being fully availed of, and the necessity which arose for holding the Umbeylah Pass in rear of the advancing force, was one which had not previously occurred in hill

warfare of those parts. In future, however, the Lt.-Govr. is of opinion that no hill expedition should be undertaken without the formation of a strong reserve close at hand.

116. *Thirdly*, regarding the route selected. The Lt.-Govr. has already stated that he considers its advantages were shown to be so great that it could not be properly rejected. And he is further of opinion that in the check which it maintained over the Judoons whose country it turned and commended and in the facilities which it ultimately afforded for the defeat of the combined tribes for the destruction of Mulkah, and for the effectual attainment of the objects of the expedition it was much superior to any other route and physically less difficult. And His Honour is further convinced that whilst by no other route could the designs of the Government have been thoroughly accomplished, a selection different from that which was made might probably have led to a similar detention in ground-equally difficult of defence but further removed from our resources, and that an entry into the Chumla valley near Kooria might equally have alarmed the Bonair tribe, even admitting that previously they were not leagued with the fanatics. His Honour remarks that a prolonged halt at any point within the hills is dangerous. Time is afforded for a combination of the tribes of which they will always avail themselves. The success which has hereto invariably attended our expeditions has been due to the secrecy and rapidity with which they have been carried out and to our retiring immediately our objects have been attained.

117. *Fourthly*, regarding the carriages furnished to the troops by the Civil authorities. His Honour observes that a number of miles far more than sufficient was collected in a remarkable space of time, the orders going out only in the latter end of September. It is quite certain that the resources of the country, and in respect of mules they are not small, were made instantly available to the army. There was no want of foresight and all was done that possibly could be. Still His Honour is very sensible that the organization of carriage is a cardinal condition of success in Hill warfare. In the Regiments under the Local Government, it is carefully observed, that their equipage is part of their standing establishment, and the animals are trained and well-fed. In the Umbeylah Pass it was proved that camels were more serviceable than mules,

their loads being raised above the brushwood and boulders instead of knocking against them. Of camels there was no deficiency and they must form and have always formed whether in the Kabul war, the Muhsood Waziri expedition or any other into the hills, the main carriage of the army. It appears to His Honour also that a Commissariat Baggage Master is indispensable in these expeditions, and that he should have power of summary punishment, and of arranging for the clearance of the load when practicable by pioneers or labourers.

118. *Fifthly*, regarding the constitution of the Force. European troops add much to the strength of a force moving into the Hills, but diminish its mobility. The amount of baggage and carriage is multiplied. The question of their presence being necessary should always be well-considered beforehand, and in the event of its being determined on, attention should be paid to their special equipment for the hills. It may be cited as proof of this necessity that a portion of the gear of one of the Punjab Batteries was taken by the European batteries which accompanied General Chamberlain as better adapted to the service to be undergone losing him the services in addition of the Punjab guns.

119. *Sixthly*, regarding the despatch of reinforcements. It has been shown that in the absence of the Govr.-General and the Comm.-in-Chief the Lt.-Governor on the first detention of the forces considered this question, and, on Genl. Chamberlain's application with the concurrence of Colonel Norman, His Honour, having regard to the possible spread of excitement in the Peshawar valley consequent on the religious character acquired by the enemy's hostility, very easily procured the advance of an additional Brigade towards the frontier. And subsequently when it was found that the force could not move on without holding the Pass this Brigade on reference (?) as a reinforcement for General Chamberlain. There was no avoidable delay in the advance of fresh troops, but the distance from Lahore is considerable, and its strength as a support to the Frontier would be increased if more rapid means for the transport of troops existed.

120. *Seventhly*, regarding the general results of the expedition. The Lt.-Govr. regards these as important and satisfactory not only have the Sittana fanatics been expelled from Mulkah, when they doubtless believed themselves unassailable as may be gathered from the permanent character of their buildings there, but about half of their number have been placed *hors de combat*, and the tribes of the Mahabun, the Judoons, the

Kudda Kheyl, and the Amazais are severally pledged not to afford them a refuge in future, whilst the destruction of Mulkah by the Bonairwals is a sufficient guarantee against their doing so. This is much, but in addition we have successfully endured the shock, within the hills, and under no favourable circumstances, of the great tribes on the Peshawar border, the Bonairwals, Swatees, Bajourees and men from Dher and elsewhere, combined to resist our entry amongst their mountains and animated by the zeal and example of their chief religious patriarch. As regards the Bonairwals the Lt.-Govr. regrets that their ignorance of our character and strength should have led them without any provocation to attack our force. They had no kind of right to the pass although the village of Umbeylaah is owned by members of their tribe ; it is an integral part of the Chumla valley the villages of which appertain to various tribes, and is under no exclusive dominion. The Bonair tribe have suffered severely for the unjust pretensions which instigated their aggression. As regards the other tribes their hostility was openly wanton and fanatical and would warrant any reprisals, if it were convenient to us to inflict them. It is satisfactory that the operations have been so decisive that it is not anticipated now that any expedition, as originally designed, will be necessary in the spring against the Hussunzais who with the exception of one principal person have already submitted.

121. *Lastly* regarding the services of the troops and officers. On no former occasion has the fighting in the hills been of so severe and sustained a character. The great distance of the many salient points of the first position from each other broke up the apparently large "force" into a series of pickets, which, whilst difficult to support quickly, were exposed to sudden and an expected onslaughts from overwhelming numbers, and when at rest to a harassing fire from excellent marksmen. The duty was incessant and dangerous and the Lt.-Govr. deplored with deep regret the large loss in men and officers which it entailed. The services of the survivors will doubtless have been brought before H. E. the Viceroy in the Military Department but remembering that a large part of the force was drawn from the troops immediately subordinate to this Govt. His Honour desires to be permitted to express his deep sense of their services. Especially His Honour would signify his appreciation of the firmness of Brig.-General Sir Neville Chamberlian during the events of the campaign, and of the skill evinced both in the successful seizure before the enemy were aware

of his design of the Umbeylah position, and in his subsequent change of that position after much preparation for the one commanding the Sheerdarra pass. His honour greatly regrets that his distinguished officer was wounded when leading the troops to the recovery of one of the pickets. He was relieved by Major-General Garvock who as having promptly supported Major James's proposals the Lt.-Govr. owes his best acknowledgments. His Honour also desires to mention Colonel Wild: C.B. Commg. the corps of Guides who superintended the blockade of the Judoons, and during the campaign afforded Genl. Chamberlain not before and after his being wounded, the greatest assistance. Lt.-Col. Vaughan Commg. 5th, P. I. Major Keyes Commg. 1st P.I., Capt. De Bude Commg. Hazara Mountain Train, Capt. Hughes Commg. Peshawar Mountain Train. Also as former members of the Punjab Irregular force though now serving under the Commr.-in-Chief Lt.-Col. Probyn. V.C., Commg. 11th B. Cav. 7, Major Brownlow, Commg. 20th N. I.

122. The abovementioned officers have during the recent campaign well maintained the reputation of the Military school in which they were trained. displaying eminently in their several capacities the high qualities indispensable to the effective leading under difficult circumstances of native troops.

123. They and others were rewarded by the staunch adherence of those troops whether Sikhs, Punjabee Muhammadans, or Pathans. The Govr.-General will not fail to discern that the Pathans fought under trials and temptations foreign to ordinary warfare.

124. The Lt.-Govr. wishes to record his grateful acknowledgment of the valuable services performed by Major James C.B. Commr. of Peshawar during the events under notice. In his prompt recognition of the true position of the Force, his active and intalligent measures to break up the confederated tribes, his earnest appeals to Genl. Garvock, (who willingly complied with them), for an immediate advance, and his successful attainment of all the results of victory. Major James has rendered very important services to the Government. A resident of thirteen years on the Peshawar Frontier and a continuous study of the politics of the tribes, had qualified Major James in a peculiar degree for their performance.

125. Colcnel Reynell Taylor, C.B. is also in the opinion of

of the Lt.-Govr. deserving of the thanks of the Government. There was little opportunity for negotiation prior to his being relieved, but he latterly held a precient view of the even qualities of the situation ; and whilst the force was acing on the defensive was personally much exposed. He was with Genl. Chamberlain when that officer was wounded. He continued. Col. Taylor has prepared a useful sketch of the Mahabun country and Chumla valley.

126. Major Coxe Dy. Commr. of Hazara had during the campaign a responsible charge in providing for the protection of Umb which was frequently threatened. His duties were performed with ability and in a manner perfectly satisfactory to his Honour.

The Lt.-Govr. would further mention Captain Munor, Deputy Commr. of Peshawar who accompanied the force.

Lt. Huddleston, who remained in charge of the Peshawar District and showed sense and coolness when excitement prevailed in the valley.

Lt. Sendman, who had charge of the Levies, Also ; *Ajub Khan*⁶⁷ and *Aziz Khan*⁶⁸, the Chief Sudhoom and the native officers and chiefs mentioned in the concluding clauses of Major James's report.

127. Lastly, the Lt.-Govr. desires to acknowledge the cordial support which he received from the Commr.-in-Chief from the time of H. E.'s arrival at Lahore.

128. During the events which have now been reported the L.-Govr. was placed in a position of unusual difficulty. The Govr.-General Lord Elgin was in a dying state in the interior of the Hills cut off from telegraph communication and unable to transact business. His Honour was therefore compelled to act solely according to his own judgment. His great object, in accordance with the declared policy of the Govt. was to prevent the extension of military operations in the area and to bring the compaign to rapid conclusion. In the measure on which he determind he had the constant advice of Colonels Durand and Norman, the Secretaries to the Govt. of India, and of his own Secretaries, Mr. Dar and Captain Black. The Lt.-Govr. accepted the entire responsibility of his own acts for he feels indebted to the officers above named for their valuable suggestions and cordial co-operation at a time of great difficulty when he was forced to act alone. At a later period after Lord Elgin's death His Honour enjoyed the firm and generous support of Sir Robert Napier C.B. who temporarily held the Govr.-General's office.

REFERENCES

1. *Amir Khan Pindaree* was the Amir of Tonk, a pathan born in the valley of Buner.

2. *Buner*, A valley inhabited by the Bunerwal is bounded on the N. W. by Swat; N.E. by the Puran Valleg; S. E. by the Mada Khel and Amazei territory, S. by the Chamla Valley and S. W. by the Yusafali. It is a small mountain valley, dotted with villages and divided into 7 sub-divisions.

3. *Barukzai Sardar* Yar Mohammad Khan of Peshawar.

4. *Lordhkur*. A village in the Swat valley.

5. *Fatteh Khan of Panjar*, the chief of the Kudu Khels.

6. *Khadi Khan of Hurd*.

6-A. On the West of the Chamla valley rises the slopes of the Matrafan Mountain to the hight of some 2,000 feet above the valley and 7,000 above sea level. The father slopes fall to the Indus, on the right bank of which are some flat open areas, *i.e.*, Sittana and other villages of the so-called Wahabi Colony. The West and lateral glens of the Mahafan are occupied by the Amerzai, gadun and other Yusufzai clan,

7. Yusufzai, are true Afghans and call themselves Banu Israil. The tribe occupying the border from the Black mountain to the Utman Khel territory are Yusufzai Pathans. This is divided into many sub-divisions. The Yusufzai inhabit the division of that same in the Peshawar districts as well as independent beyond the border.

8. *Umb*. Territory is a square block in the n.w. corner of the district of Hazara, separated on its west from the independent Pathan country by the Indus, the Black mountain and Agrar to the north. The Nawab of Amb held his cis-Indus territory as a jagir from the British government on a perpetiral tenure.

9. *Paklee* a valley in the Hazara district.

10. *Syed Akbar Shah* was held in great veneration by the Utmanzai, and neighbouring tribes. He was the bitterest enemy of the Sikhs and as treasurer and counsellor to Sayyad Ahmad, and therefore allowed the Hindustanis to gather around him in the vilage of Sittana. He was proclaimed as the king of Swat.

11. Akhund of Swat was originally a Sayyad of Buner. He had passed his life in close study aseciticism and had gained an immense ascendancy over the mindis of Muslims particularly over the tribes on the Peshawar frontier.

12. Hassanzai are a section of the Isazai Pathans. They reside on both sides of the Indus, are divided into 10 sub-division. Their fighting strength is about 2,000.

13. Jehandad Khan was the chief of Amb, an ally of the British and always sides with them.

14. Mungal Thanah a stronghold in Mukarrab Khan's territory, *viz.*, Panjar, who gave it to the Hindustan's and the Sayyads. It stands on one of the chief spurs of the Mahaban Mountain and west the head quarter of Moulvi Inayat Ali Khan.

15. Cheglai was a large village containing about 1,000 houses.
16. The Otmanzai are a division of the Mardan Yusufzais divided into 4 sections, viz., Alazai, Kanazai, Akazai and Saduzai. The Otmanami division of Yusufzais takes its name from this tribe. They are considered as better soldiers, but are numerically weak.
17. Gadun Pathan tribe who reside partly in independent territory and partly in the Hazara district. The origin of the tribe is not clear. They are supposed to be a branch of the Kakar tribe which was driven to take refuge in the Sufed Koh afterwards in Hazara and Choch in the Pindi district. The Gaduns are divided into Salar and Mansur which are sub-divided into many sections. Their fighting strength is about 2,500.
18. Malka is situated on an elevated plateau; on a northern spur of the Mahaban range. It was a much larger and substantial place; containing several large edifices, but no regular fortifications. The outer walls of the houses were connected and formed a continuous line of defence with posterns. There ^{is} also a tower at the gate way.
19. Siri a place in the Gadun territory.
20. Maulvi Abdulla was the military leader of the Hindustani fanatics. He was the nephew of Maulvi Inayat Ali Khan. He was a man of good ability and tried to drill the Hindustani fanatics on the British system.
21. A Frontier village under British control.
22. Shoongle hamlet is in the little Shunglo valley of the Black Mountain, in which the most advanced outpost of the Amb territory is situated.
23. Tanawal is a very rough hilly country between Siran on the east and the Black mountain and the river Indus on the west. It is the appanage of the Khans of Amb and Phulra north of Tanawal is Agror.
24. Akazais are the inhabitants of Swat, a division of the Yusufzai Pathans. The five districts, Baizal, Rahizai, Khadakzai, Abazai, and Khwazai have received their names from the five cleans of the Akozai by which they are held.
25. Agrore is a portion of Hazara to the north of Tarawal.
26. Borendu River is a tributary of the Indus and drain the Peshawar area.
27. The Chgarzai's are a section of the Malizal clan of Yusufzai tribe of Pathans, They are descended from Chagar, the son of Mali, who was one of the sons of Yusuf. They inhabit the country on both sides of the Indus. These cis-Indus tribes are located on the western slopes of the Black Mountain to the north of Akazais. The Chagarzais are divided into 3 sub-divisions, Nasrat Khel, Ferozai and Basi Khel. The first and the last are the cis Indus area, with a few villages on the right bank. The Ferozai are entirely trans-Indus and occupy the slopes of the Duma mountains towards Buner.
28. Khabal is the principal village of the Utmanzai, at a distance of about four miles from Sittana opposite Tarbela.
29. Murdee a colony of the Hindustan fanatics near Sittana. It contained a fort named Murdee built by the Hindustanians.
30. Mada Khel are a section of the Isazai Yusufzai's and are settled along the bank of Indus. The Madakhel tribe is divided into three principal divisions with 2,700 fighting men.

31. Amazai are a section of Usmanzai Yusufzais. About half of their country is within and the rest beyond the British border. The section has two divisions—Daulatzai and Ismailzai. Their fighting strength is about 2,000 and are considered one of the best fighting clans of all the Yusufzais.
32. Khudukhel are a sub-division of the Daduzai section of the Utmanzai Mandan Yusufzais. They are divided into Usman Khel and Bamkhel.
33. Chamla valley is inhabited by members of different tribes to the north of the Khudu Khel territory and separated from Buner by the Guru range.
34. Hasan Ali Khan the chief of the Hasanazais.
35. A village in the Gadun territory.
36. Swabee Manairi was the headquarters of the guide.
37. Rustam ka Bazar is in the Sadum valley inhabited by the Daulatzai, being their chief village.
38. 34.2 N.—72.4 F Pass in Buner also known as Surkhawai Ambela Pass which gave its name to the Ambela campaign of 1863.
39. Cherara is the chief village in the Amazai country.
40. Bunerwala inhabit the Buner valley. They are simple and austere in their habits, religious and truthful in their ways, hospitable to all who seek shelter amongst them. Bunerwals are considered one of the finest race of the Pathans. Their fighting strength is about 8000. They are not dependent on the British territory and fear a blockade less than any other tribe.
41. Sudum valley is in the British territory, the Daulatzai inhabit this valley and their chief villages are Chargulai and Rustam.
42. Mullendri Pass is in Buner and fit for transport of goods on animal backs.
43. Kotah is a village in the south-west corner of Yusufzai territory. Syed Amir known as the Kota Mulla was the religious rival of the Akhund.
44. Darband a village in Hazara.
45. A British village in the frontier area twenty miles east of Mardan.
46. Mubarak Shah was the son of Sayyad Akbar Shah, the ruler of Swat.
47. Lalue village in the Chamla valley.
48. Tarputtee Pass is in the Khudu Khel Country.
49. An open plain in the Chamla valley—the surface of the valley was level, free from obstructions, and practicable for field artillery.
50. Kogah is the largest village in the Chamla valley.
51. A Pass in Buner.
52. A village in the Peshawar district.
53. Ahmad Khan was the chief of Bunerwals.
54. Salarzais are a powerful clan, and the fighting strength is 1,800. They are subdivided into the Malikhel and the Aibkhel. They have fourteen villages, of which Jowar is the largest and most important. The Salarzai are a section of the Buner tribe.
55. Ashazais are located at the base of the isolated Jaffer hill, having the Salarzais on their west, and the Nourazais on the south. It is one of the most warlike clans in Buner, and its central position gives it a prominent place in the politics of the country. They are divided into four sections, the Khadim Khel, Aya Khel, Musara Khel and the Khakizai.

56. Ranizais inhabit the lower end of the Swat valley and their fighting strength is about 3,000 men. They are all resident beyond the British border. Their country is divided into two territorial divisions, *viz.*, Bar and Swat, and Sam or lowland Ranizai.

57. Sobat Khan was the chief of Swat.

58. Faizlalub Khan was the chief of the best part of Bajour and was said to be the most powerful of all the chiefs around. He was styled Haji Sahibzada for having performed haj, his influence extending beyond his own province.

59. Haji Sahib of Kunar, a valley to the north-east of Jalalabad. He was reputed to be very holy, and gifted with the power of counteracting the effects of bullets.

60. The Mohmands are of Pathan tribes who inhabit the hilly country to the north-west of Peshawar and who own a nominal allegiance to the Amir of Kabal. Their country is bounded on the east by British territory from near Jamrud to Fort Abazai and thence by the Utmanikhel country; on the north by Bajour, on the west by Kunar and on the south by the territories of the Shinwari and Afridi tribes. The Mohmand tribe consists of four divisions: The Tarakzai, Halimzai, Baizai, and Khwaizai.

61. A village in the Peshawar district.

62. The Waziris are a large tribe of Pathans, who inhabit the country beyond the British border, from that in Miranzai to the Gomal Pass. The Waziris are descended from, Wazir, son of Suleman. The Waziris are divided into five main branches, *viz.*, Utmanzai, Ahmadzai, Mahsud, Gurbaz and Lali. Their fighting strength is about 41,630.

63. Not identified.

64. Not identified.

65. Dir is the mountainous country drained by the Panjkore and its tributaries. It has an area of between 4,000 to 5,000 square miles. It is inhabited by Yusufzai Pathans, of whom the most important are the Paindekhel. Dir territory extends up the Panjkore valley.

66. Kabul Khan son of Hassan Ali Khan of Hassanzais.

67. Ajeb Khan of Chargulai helped the British Government during the Ambala expedition. Ajeb Khan and Aziz Khan were constantly employed by Major James in difficult and delicate business connected with the negotiations and proved themselves loyal and true to the British Government.

68. Aziz Khan was the chief of Sadum valley, and brother of Ajeb Khan of Chargulai.

Mahmud of Ghazna and the Historians

If the study of history may liberate man from the past, the study of historiography may liberate him from past historians. To act in the future requires awareness in the present—the awareness of what may be done in the future because it has not already been done in the present. In any branch of systematic investigation, the knowledge of the current state of study of a subject may be an essential preliminary to fresh advances in that subject. At the least such knowledge may save unnecessary duplication of labour. But the study of the history of history may also save the historian of particular themes or episodes or 'subjects' from the sin of *hubris*, of thinking that he is an island of light in a sea of ignorance, the self-sufficient and presiding genius whose efforts and whose findings owe nothing to earlier workers, between whom and the period of problem he is studying nothing stands, the clear fresh cutting mind at work on the shaping of the raw uncut diamonds of historical fact—as though he were endowed at birth with the innate capacity for recognising raw uncut diamonds, and for finding them lying naturally in his path, as though they did not need to be first mined and then transported through time and space to the cutter himself.

As the study of historiography has the advantage of teaching the historian who takes up a subject that he stands himself in a line of historical succession, so that study may also teach him exactly what his place in that line of succession is—may teach him awareness of his own limitations not only of time and place but also of thought, feeling and imagination. It is not difficult for the historian, conscious of the systematic and orderly processes of thought demanded of him in the discovery of historical fact and believing that his is but a plain tale to be told, to delude himself that his mind is pure, rational and sovereign, that he will but set down the plain unadorned historical truth—that he is himself not like other men, still less other historians, in having interests and sympathies, personal, social or political or certain unarticulate premises, philosophical, religious or ideological—that he is himself above history. The history of history which shall be something more than a list of names of historians and a brief catalogue of the

titles of their works, which shall examine their general conceptions of the course of the ages, of chronological scale, of what makes history 'tick', of what are the relevant questions we should ask about the past—such a history may teach a man much about his own assumptions if only by revealing to him his distaste for those of his peers and predecessors. What unconscious differences of values are betrayed by the fact that some historians date their events A.D. and others A.H. or that the history of the cradle-lands of Islam is treated in my university under the heading of 'History of the Near and Middle East' or that the history of Europe and America is studied in the University of Karachi under the category of 'General History'!

Thus, for a Historical Conference peculiarly concerned with the future course of historical investigation in Pakistan, it may be relevant to review the categories of thought under which one of the great series of events in the history of the sub-continent have been studied by earlier historians. I refer to the Ghaznavid invasions of Hindustan in the time of Subuktigin and Mahmud ibn Subuktigin—a series of episodes which no historian for whatever reasons has been inclined to pass over as either trivial in itself or in its consequences. Indeed, few other episodes in the history of the sub-continent have had an equal faculty of suddenly silhouetting the scaffolding of historians' general ideas and assumptions which have made possible the structure of the narrative of the invasions themselves. This review cannot claim to be exhaustive but it is hoped that it is extensive.

Probably the earliest reference in a European language to Ghazna and the Ghaznavids is to be found in the *Bibliothèque Orientale*, edited by D'Herbelot, Paris, 1697. In the articles 'Gazna' (p. 364) and 'Mahmoud fils de Sebeckteghin' (pp. 533—537) based on Mir Khwand and Khwandamir, the Ghaznavids are described as a race of princes and a dynasty of great kings who ruled in Khurasan, Persia and the Indies. The articles give a chronological list of the Ghaznavid rulers and a factual narrative of the campaign without explanation or rhetoric or declamation. Anecdotes upon Mahmud's sense of justice are however included. The first general European history of Asia in which Mahmud of Ghazna figures, is Deguignes, *Historie Generale des Huns, des Turcs, des Mogols et des autres Tartares occidentaux*, Vol. II, Paris, 1756 (pp. 155—173). There he is placed in a Central Asian

rather than a specifically Islamic or indeed Indian setting. Deguignes states that the Ghaznavid Turks were not members of an entire Turkish nation which had come from Turkestan, but were slaves bought by Muslim princes and introduced into their counsels. Deguignes describes how Alptagin was involved in 961 A.D. in trouble over the Samanid succession and how he sought safety from his enemies at Ghazna. An account of later Samanid struggles with their factious nobles and with the Qara-Khanids is given and how Mahmud's policy was to acquire the Samanid dominion south of the Oxus while the Qara-Khanids were acquiring those to the north. The Indian campaigns are narrated in an annalistic arrangement, and are not seen as possibly related to Mahmud's Central Asian ambitions and necessities. Nor are they narrated rhetorically as a clash between Islam and Hinduism. Deguignes says (p. 161) that the titles which Mahmud received from the Caliphs he regarded as beneath him and of little practical value. Mahmud regarded India as a place of great booty. Although Deguignes states he carried Islam there, this is apparently a figure of speech rather than a fully considered judgment that Mahmud had a policy of conversion or of subjugation of Hinduism to Islam either politically or religiously; India was an arena for a great conqueror, religious differences were incidental. In his language, Deguignes appears to follow whichever source he is using at the moment—Abu'l Fida, Al-Makin and Mir Khwand for example.

It is evident that Deguignes sees Mahmud's career in the context of Central Asian history, as a prelude to the rise of the Seljuqs whose history he treats in greater detail, presumably for its greater direct importance for the history of the Crusades, the Byzantine empire and medieval Europe.

The Universal History (Modern Part), Vols. I and II, London, 1759, sees Mahmud in two contexts—that of the general history of the Arabs after the death of the Prophet and that of the Turks and Seljuqs. Book I, Chapter II, Section XLVI of the *Modern Universal History* is an annalistic account of the Muslim world in which events are grouped by year of occurrence, not by theme or area. Mahmud's deeds whether in Central Asia or India are recorded without analysis or comment among quite extraneous events in 'Arab' history, Under 421/1030 (p. 534) however, Mahmud's heroic virtues and his

justice are noted together with his 'only vice', that of too eager a desire to amass riches, a desire which India enabled him to gratify fully.

In Vol. II, Book II, Mahmud's career is seen as part of the general history of the Turks and of their empires in Tartary and Lower Asia. The Ghaznavids are described as the first Turkish sovereigns in Persia who were 'Muhammadans'. The Turks swarmed all over the dominions of the Khalifahs but were kept within bounds in the Samanid territories until the reign of Nuh ibn Mansur Samani (p. 137). Rebels against him invited in the Qara-Khanids of Turkestan. Subuktigin 'a famous general' of Nuh's having returned with laurels from India marched against the rebels against Nuh ibn Mansur. Subuktigin was a Turk 'by nation' and originally a slave of Alptagin. Mahmud is depicted as warring against other fractious nobles of the Samanid kingdom rather than as a warrior for either empire or Islam in Hindustan. Indeed, Vol. III of the *Universal Modern History* which, like volumes I and II, was written by one John Swinton, thinks that Muslim history in India begins with the Mughals, *i.e.*, with Timur. The author indeed emphasizes the differences between Mughals (whom he views as a conquering nation or people), the Hindus and the Parsis, but this as a phenomenon of his own day. For the *Universal History* there is the history of the Arabs, the history of the Turks and Tartars and the history of Hindustan under the Mughals. Of any integral and intimate connexion between the three historical spheres and of Mahmud's role in that possible connexion, the authors of *Universal History* seem unaware. Swinton certainly does not see a stark confrontation of the Muslim and the Hindu worlds in Asia in Mahmud's time.

Robert Orme, 'A Dissertation on the Establishments made by Muhammadan Conquerors in Indostan' prefacing *A History of the Military Transactions of the British Nation in Indostan*, Vol. London, 1763, visualizes Mahmud's career under the category of the conquest of the Hindus by their more vigorous Muslim neighbours. Depicting (p. 3 *et seq.*) the mild and gentle character of the Hindu, enjoying a peaceful domestic life, he states that the people of India (whom he equates with the Hindus) 'have from time immemorial been as addicted to commerce as they have been averse to war. They have always been

immensely rich, and have always remained incapable of defending their wealth'. His conception of Mahmud speaks for itself, 'Mahmoud, son of Sebegtechin, prince of Gazna, the capital of a province separated by mountains from the north west parts of India, and situated near Kandahor, carried the Alcoran with the sword into Indostan in the year 1000 or 1002 of our Aera. He maintained himself in a vast territory out of and seems to have subdued as large a one in, India if it is true he carried his conquests as far to the south as the present capital of the kingdom of Viscapore near Goa. He treated the Indians with all the signs of a conqueror and all the fury of a converter, plundering treasures, demolishing temples, murdering idolaters throughout his rout' (*sic*—route).

Edward Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, London, 1776-88, chapter LVII, viewed the Ghaznavids in the context of the rise of the Saljuq Turks, that is as part of the backcloth to the historical drama of the clash between the Byzantine empire and the Muslim world. Although Gibbon states that 'the principal source of his fame and riches was the holy war which he waged against the Gentoos of Hindustan' and indeed declaims upon the capture of Somnath; for him the exploits of Mahmud in Hindustan are essentially a 'foreign narrative'.

Mahmud he regards as a 'Turkish prince' who 'reigned in the eastern provinces of Persia one thousand years after the birth of Christ'. Subuktigin was 'the slave of the slave of the slave of the commander of the faithful', the faithful servant of 'a lieutenant of the Samanides' Alptagin who had revolted against the Samanids. Although in other parts (e.g. chapter XXVI and the later sections of chapter LVII of *The Decline*) he is keenly aware of the importance of the social geography of Central Asia and of the role of its pastoral peoples in world history—as destroyers of the Roman empire—Gibbon does not comment on the nature of the Ghaznavid empire which he calls 'a Persian kingdom', or upon the character of its agents. By distinguishing between Mahmud as a Turk and the Seliuqs as Turkmans, Gibbon implies that Mahmud's polity was not a nomad polity.

Gibbon attributes Mahmud's invasion of Hindustan to urges which he regards as complementary, namely ambition, avarice and Muslim zeal.

Gibbon implies that Mahmud distinguished between the peoples of Hindustan and their religion: 'on payment of a tribute the *rajahs* preserved their dominions, the people their lives and fortunes; but to the religion of Hindustan the zealous Mussulman was cruel and inexorable; many hundred temples or pagodas were levelled with the ground, many thousand idols were demolished, and the servants of the prophet were stimulated and rewarded by the precious materials of which they were composed'.

Gibbon nowhere describes the state of 'Hindustan' at the time of Mahmud's invasion but implies that in the eleventh century A.D. it offered the opportunity of 'a softer and more wealthy conquest'.

The picture of general history and of Mahmud's part in that picture which Gibbon *Decline and Fall* evokes is one in which Islam is seen as a civilisation the members of which are inspired by religious zeal to attack non-Muslims, a religion of the great Asian mainland for which political and spiritual success are the obverse and reverse of the same coin of conquest, a religion capable of inspiring now Arabs, now Turks and now Turkmans to striking and dramatic deeds and imperial achievements. He does not like Islam; but neither does he like Christianity. This equal dislike of both, however, does not blind him to the force of religious passion in history.

From the design and balance of his history, it is evident that Gibbon considers Islam and Muslims to be of equal weight with Christianity and Christians in the making of world history. Hinduism and Hindus are, however, depicted as passive objects of the attentions of more virile faiths and peoples. Thus while Gibbon is as interested in the inner working of Muslim societies as he is in the inner working of Christian, this interest does not extend to Hindu society. With the analysis of possible internal weaknesses in the sub-continent at the time of the Ghaznavid attacks, he is not concerned. He moralizes from a standpoint in London, Rome or Constantinople, not in Delhi, Calcutta or Lahore. He is aware of the Roman Empire in decline, not of the East India Company in ascent.

The rise of the East India Company to political power in India stimulated the production of histories in which the fortunes of Hindustan were central not peripheral. Among to first was *The*

Modern History of Hindustan by Thomas Maurice, London, 1802. Like Gibbon, Maurice drew his account from Deguignes and Dow's *Firishta*.

Maurice believed (preface p. viii) that the true historian 'descends not to trivial incidents, but seizing the striking facts and prominent characters of the times, consigns them to immortality on the faithful tablet of her (history's) recording page'. But although he should give valour its due tribute 'he should never forget.....to expose in terms of just and warm indignation the sanguinary principles that too frequently accompany the warrior to the field of Asiatic conflict; the ferocity of Muhammadan zeal, the ravages of Tartar barbarity'.

Maurice emphasizes the decisive role of Central Asia in the history of the Euro-Asian land mass. This 'exhaustless hive' is populated by the 'barbarous race' of the Tartar tribes, descendants of the ancient Scythian tribes, struggling to subsist by pasturage and given to 'successful irruption into provinces more fertile than their own sandy deserts'.

Utilizing Abu'l Fida, Maurice gives a geographical description of Khwarazm and Transoxiana. Subuktigin, says Maurice, was a 'Tartar' by birth and a soldier of fortune: he commenced 'a destructive war' on the idolatous of India under 'the usual pretext of religion' perhaps in to order 'give employment to the turbulent and warlike Afghans'. Mahmud, 'inflamed with all the unrelenting bigotry of a true Mussulman' swore at his accession to continue the attack. The plundering of 'India's treasure house' was the consequence of Mahmud's 'execrable bigotry' and 'insatiable avarice'—the 'passion for spoil of a Tartar commander' (p. 236).

Maurice portrays (p. 2) the 'Indians', whom the context shows he equates with Hindus, as constituting a 'nation'. (At one place, p. 236, Jaipal is represented as ruling over a 'nation'). Sketching the political state of India at the time of the rise of Islam, he speaks (p. 163) of 'the nominal dependence at least of the great feudal chiefs of India on the head rajah', namely the ruler of Kanauj. The Rajputs are described as an 'intrepid and subtle race'. He explains the outcome of Mahmud's invasions more in terms of Muslim success than of Hindu failure. It was the nature of Muslim conquerors from Central Asia to be ferocious and fanatical. Nevertheless they were stoutly resisted; Maurice does not suggest that there were any inherent weaknesses in either Indian political or social organization; it was merely India's unfortunate destiny to be

a victim of the pastoral people—the 'Tartars'—of Central Asia to whose vigour was now added the zeal of religion.

Maurice's *Modern History*, in stressing the explosive force generated by a fusion of nomadism and Islam, etched deeper the lines in that picture of general history which depicted a confrontation between a militant Muslim world and a passive Indian world. Maurice did not suggest that there was a contest between Islam and Hinduism on religious systems, but the presence of the Muslim factor did distinguish sharply the Ghaznavid from earlier invasions from the north west and open a new phase in the history of the sub-continent. Maurice disregarded Mahmud's relations with other Central Asian powers and did not examine the organization of his empire or the composition of the people within it. For him all the peoples of Central Asia in Mahmud's time were 'Tartars'. Ascribing everything to personal 'ferocity' and 'fanaticism' and seeking high drama in history, Maurice did nothing to encourage a closer look at the structure of either Indian or Ghaznavid society, the nature of his source admittedly did not suggest such an approach would be fruitful. Contemptuous of both Islam and Hinduism, Maurice portends later European attitudes that Asian history is a spectacle of human depravity in which the villains look so much larger than life that they are inhuman. For all his show about the vital significance of Central Asia, Maurice's rhetorical approach left historical interpretation very much in the same categories of historical explanation as did the eighteenth century 'enlightenment'—that some men and some societies have developed the faculty of reason and act accordingly and that others have remained merely at the stage of passion and instinct, and act accordingly. Signs of a withholding of imaginative sympathy from the Asian segment of humanity are beginning to appear.

David Price, *Chronological Retrospect of Muhammadan History*, Vol. II, London, 1812, is significant in the historiography of the Ghaznavid invasions in India not so much for his own mode of interpretation as for the use which subsequent historians made (or did not make) of the data he provided. On the basis of Firishta and of Khwand-Amir's *Khulasat-ul-Akhbar*, he offered a detailed chronological account not only of Ghaznavid wars against Indian powers but also of the rise of Ghazna in the context of Samanid history and of Ghaznavid wars against their Central Asian rivals; indeed Price's viewpoint is that

of an historian who considers Central Asian events as important, if not more important than the Indian. He does not attempt any explanation of the events he records nor any analysis of circumstances, political, social, religious or geographical. If, however, after Price's work (as indeed after Deguignes), historians of India concentrated upon the relations of Ghazna with Hindustan and tended to neglect the Ghaznavid empire's wider political setting, it was not for lack of data, exclusively political though the data in the *Chronological Retrospect* might be.

For James Mill, *History of British India*, 1817, Mahmud's invasions were less dramatic but more significant in that they introduced to India a civilization higher in the scale of civilization than the Hindu. Mill, judging by 'the principles of utility', held the manners of the Muslims to be manly and independent, their system of law more rational, their religion more free from absurdity', their system of government more regular and their society 'exempt from the institution of caste' and as one in which 'all men are treated as equal'. His account of Mahmud's campaigns is, therefore, altogether in a lower key than that of his British predecessors and describes detachedly the immediate political situation from which each expedition arose without indulging in rhetorical descriptions of plunder and fanaticism.

Mill, following his predecessors, enlarges upon (Book III, chapter I) the role of those 'Tartars' who adopted Islam and served the Abbasid Caliph and its successor kingdoms. (These Tartars he calls 'Turks'). He regards Subuktigin as a servant of the Samanids and as 'governor of the Indian province of Candahar, or Ghazna, as it is called by the Persian writers'. The 'religious sultan', Mahmud, asserted his independence and 'subverted the throne of the Samanides'. Mill describes Mahmud as 'the sovereign of Persia'; and 'the northern provinces of India, Cabul, Candahar, Multan and the Punjab, as usually following the destiny of Bactria, Khurasan and Transoxiana and thus to have been 'always subject to a foreign yoke'. 'It appears', writes Mill, 'that the people of Hindustan have at all times been subject to incursions and conquest, by the nations contiguous to them on the north-west'.

Mill's *History* is not intended as a critical reconstruction of the past in which the dilemmas and choices of historical men are sympathetically treated. It is to be a practical guide for the East India Company

in India in that it establishes the place of Hindu and Muslim institutions in a scale of civilization—computed on utilitarian principles—according as Hindu and Muslim social practices have conduced to the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Hence Mill offers no examination of either Ghaznavid or of Hindu society contemporary with it, but rather a narrative of events in the time of Subuktigin and Mahmud differing little (except in the absence of rhetoric and hyperbole) from Gibbon's or Maurice's. Mill's history emphasizes the difference between Islam and Hinduism and its arrangement implies periodization of the history of the sub-continent into Hindu and Muslim eras. For Mill, the differences between the two stem from the differences between a less and a more 'rational' state of the human mind. For Mill, history is the spectacle of individual men, each responsible for his actions and each choosing freely his goals with a greater or lesser degree of rationality and ability effectively to correlate means and ends.

G. R. Gleig, *The History of the British Empire in India*, London, 1830, Vol. I, pp. 59—70, enjoyed the advantage of Brigg's translation of Firishta, published in the previous year but his account, though in detail more accurate, follows the main outlines of his British predecessors. The people of India have always been subject to conquest from the north-west, the Turks were a tribe of Tartars from the Altai mountains who rose to prominence and eventually to power under the Abbasid Caliphs and their eastern successor principalities Alptigin set up at Ghazna as a retreat from enemies at the Samanid court and Subuktigin eventually succeeded to him as a loyal and faithful servant. Subuktigin deserves notice, says Gleig, as 'the first Muhammadan sovereign who turned his arms against the worshippers of Brahma'. Mahmud is seen as desiring plunder and the propagation of Islam more than empire.

Gleig adds to earlier British historians in noticing (pp. 64—5) that the internal condition of Hindustan was 'particularly favourable to the ambitious projects of Mahmud' as 'instead of a single emperor or even two or three emperors, it supported at least as many independent rajahs as there were in after times scattered over it viceroys to the Mogul; nor does there appear to have subsisted among them any bond of union more lasting than caprice or some sudden emergency might from time to time create'. These rajahs were therefore defeated in

detail. Again Gleig sees the Ghaznavid invasions as essentially a clash between Turkish Islam and Hindu India, a clash in the logic of history, needing no exhaustive analysis and explanation but rather a clear narrative.

With Mountstuart Elphinstone's *History of India*, Vol. I, London, 1841, a significant break-through into a new dimension of historical interpretation of the Ghaznavid invasions is achieved. Although aware of the then paucity of materials for such a purpose, Elphinstone attempts an analysis of the state of society and manners in 'the court or neighbourhood' of Ghazna. 'Things were much changed since the time of the Arab conquests . . . , . though many Arabs were still employed, both as soldiers and majistrates, even they were only Arabs by descent, while a great portion of the court and army were Turks, and the rest, with almost all the people, were Persians'. The Turks, says Elphinstone, had not come into Ghazna as conquerors, but as slaves whose courage, habits of obedience, dependent condition and 'want of connection with all around them recommended them to the confidence of absolute monarchs and led to their general employment'. The house of Ghazna, though Turks themselves, were less under the influence of their countrymen than most of their contemporaries. Alptagin may have had some Mamlukes and other Turks in his service 'but the main body of his army, and all his subjects, were natives of the country around Ghizni. Mahmud himself was born of a Persian mother and was in language and manners a Persian, but his increased resources, and the conquest of Transoxiana (*sic*) would draw more Turks about him'. Elphinstone contrasts the nomad Arabs with the nomad Tartars. 'Whenever the Arabs conquered, they left indelible traces of their presence; religion, law, philosophy and literature, all took a new character from them The Tartars on the other hand, have neither founded a religion nor introduced a literature; and, so far from impressing their own stamp on others, they have universally melted into that of the nations among whom they settled In the present instance, their character took its bias from the Persians, a people very likely to influence all who came into contact with them'.

Elphinstone defines the relation of 'the different nations to the government' as follows: Religion and law were Arabian, though the

latter was modified by local custom; the Sultan had a body of mounted guards who were Turki. Afghans and Khaljis were also spoken of as components of the Ghaznavid armies; but 'general commands' were held by the king's own officers who, by their names, seem generally to have been Turks. Elphinstone notes that Mahmud employed Hindu troops too. 'The civil administration must have been entirely conducted by Persians' and Persian was usually, though not always, the language of administration. Some rivalry existed between 'the great Turki generals' and the Persian wazirs.

Elphinstone also analyses carefully Mahmud's motives in his invasion of Hindustan. He finds the charge of avarice proven but not that of bigotry. 'Mahmud', he writes (p. 568) 'carried on war with the infidels because it was a source of gain, and, in his day, the greatest source of glory. He professed and probably felt, like other Mussulmans, an ardent wish for the propagation of his faith; but he never sacrificed the least of his interests for the accomplishment of that object; and he even seems to have been perfectly indifferent to it, when he might have attained it without loss. One province permanently occupied, would have done more for conversion than all his inroads, which only hardened the hearts of the Hindus against a religion which presented itself in such a form Far from forcing conversions, like Muhammad Casim, we do not hear that in his long residence in Gujerat or his occupation of Lahore, he even made a convert at all. His only ally (the Raja of Canouj) was an unconverted Hindu. His transactions with the Raja of Lahore were entirely guided by policy without reference to religion; and when he placed a Hindu devotee on the throne of Gujerat, his thoughts must have been otherwise directed than to the means of propagating Islam It is nowhere asserted that he ever put a Hindu to death except the battle or in the storm of a fort. His only massacres were among his brother Mussulmans in Persia The Mahometan historians are so far from giving him credit for a blind attachment to the faith that they charge him with scepticism It is certain however that he was most attentive to the forms of religion'.

Nowhere in the context of the narrative itself of the Ghaznavid invasions does Elphinstone comment upon possible reasons for the failure

of the peoples of India successfully to resist Mahmud's attacks. Indeed he says (Vol. I, p.148) that at 'the time of the Mahometan invasions from Ghazni, the Hindus were capable of systematic plans, pursued through several campaigns'. In commenting upon the character of the Hindus, Elphinstone suggests (p. 384) their religion encourages inaction, 'which is the first step towards decay' but does not relate the general judgment to the specific circumstances of the early eleventh century of the Christian era.

The picture of general history which Elphinstone leaves is one in which the periodization of the history of the sub-continent into Hindu and Muslim eras is still most significant but in a political rather than in a cultural or religious sense. [In Book VIII, chapter III (Vol. II, pp. 238-9) he emphasizes the numerical limits of conversions and in Book IX on Akbar he records the forces making for cultural tolerance if not assimilation.] Politics still determine the main outlines of the story; the history of the sub-continent is been mainly as a history of conquest with Hindus more remarkable for their social, cultural and religious than for their political achievements.

H. Beveridge, *A Comprehensive History of India*. London, 1867, and J.C. Marshman, *The History of India*, 1869, were written to celebrate the progress of British power in India and give proportionately little space to 'native' history. The account of Mahmud's invasions is in narrative form. Mill, Briggs' *Firishta* and Elphinstone formed its basis. Both writers, however, state that Jaipal, fearing the establishment of a Muslim kingdom on the borders of the Panjab, an area whose fortunes had been linked for centuries with 'Cabul' and 'Candahar', attacked Subuktigin before Subuktigin attacked him, being determined 'to anticipate any designs which Subuktigin might form on India' (Marshman, I, p. 28). Both authors follow the by now conventional periodization of the history of the sub-continent into Hindu and Muslim periods, conceived in political terms. For both Beveridge and Marshman, political conquest and Islam are synonymous.

J. Talboys Wheeler, *The History of India from the Earliest Times*, Vol. IV, pt. 1, *Mussulman Rule*, London, 1876, writing in the light of the events of 1857, regards the Hindu-Muslim relationship and inter-action as the most significant theme in the history of the sub-continent from the viewpoint of the British rulers of his day, leading now to antagonism,

now to co-operation (as in 1857). He divides the history of 'Mussulman India' (which, he says, 'is the record of a collision between two races, the Turks and the Hindus') into four phases, denominated according to the religious principles deemed to be uppermost in each phase. The four phases are the Sunni, the Shiaina (the period of Muslim conquest of the Deccan), the Sufi (Akbar and Shah Jahan) and that of Sunni revival (Aurangzeb). Mahmud of Ghazna falls within the Sunni orthodox phase when Hindu-Muslim antagonism was most acute. Wheeler gives an account of 'the Turkish uprising ; one of the most important revolutions in modern Asiatic history' and gives due place to the slave element in the Ghaznavid system. But this early phase is one of conflict between the two forms of faith and worship in which the Mussulmans were breaking down temples and idols and the Hindus were compelled to stand on the defensive, holding fast to their idolatry. The conflict was both racial and religious, 'a collision between Islam and Brahmanism'. With strong racial and religious antipathies himself, Wheeler saw religious antagonism as the great force in India's history, a force of which the British could take advantage in order to ensure the stability of their rule.

H. G. Keene, *History of India, 2 Vols.*, London, 1893, rhetorically presents the by now familiar story of the conquest of Hindu India by virile foreign Muslim nomads. First there is a picture of 'an Arcadian scheme of manners' in Hindu India before Muslim conquest. 'The Hindus led their easy lives, relaxing under the increasing influences of luxury and peace'. But, 'far off, beyond the glaciers of the Himalayas, the home of the negligent gods, was a swarm of hardy, hungry nomads, constantly engaged in tribal conflicts for their world pastures, or slowly gathering for defence in drowded towns'. (Vol. I, p. 51). After an (inaccurate) reference to the rise of Subuktigin, Mahmud is described as writing the annals of India in blood, and as a ruthless iconclast. But he had the saving grace of avoiding 'the temptation of extending his conquests permanently beyond his means of administering, them. Therefore, in India he contented himself with the possessions of his father ; and while amassing wealth by the plunder of the rest of the country, made no attempt to retain possession of the Government'. (Vol. I, p. 55). Keene does not consider either the Central Asian or the Hindustani background in any detail and does not evaluate Mahmud's motives or attempt to place him in any but the most broadly-conceived

historical situation. His real conviction is that the history of India before the British conquest was all dark. If 'our narrative has seemed to dwell almost exclusively on the wars and intrigues of selfish or contentious public men, let it be considered that we have been necessarily confined to such matters by the very nature of the case. In the next portion of our study—though we shall not be entirely free from such subjects,—we shall have the satisfaction of observing the unmistakable advance of the Indian races to a united nationality and a common civilisation' (p. 449). Earlier, (p. 447) Keene has quoted with approval the opinion of a Russian publicist that 'the English have been the saviours of India. During whole centuries the history of India presents one continuing spectacle of murder and devastation. The bloody era terminates with the conquest of India by the English, whose rule has been incomparably more mild, human and just, than all the Governments under which the Hindus have ever lived'. Mahmud then is merely a fit subject for declamation rather than for sympathetic understanding.

At the turn of the nineteenth century, developments outside south Asian studies should have had a profound effect upon the perspectives in which Mahmud's invasions of Hindustan were viewed. Perhaps the language barrier between English and Russian partly explains why they did not. In 1899 F. H. Skrine and E. Denison Ross, *The Heart of Asia* sketched in the Central Asia background to the Ghaznavid empire in far greater political detail than at any time since Deguignes' *Histoire des Huns* and in 1902, E. G. Brown's *A Literary History of Persis*, Vol. 1, provided an account of the cultural life of the Ghaznavid court in greater depth than hitherto. But above all in 1900 appeared the first (Russian) edition of W. Barthold's *Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion* (second [English] edition, London, 1928). Barthold was not directly concerned with Mahmud in India, although he discusses the effects on the Indian campaigns on Mahmud's empire in Central Asia. To date Barthold's work may be regarded as a definitive account of Mahmud's activities in Central Asia and it is a pity that even after the appearance of the revised and expanded edition of 1928 in English that the work was and has been neglected by historians mainly interested in Mahmud's doings in Hindustan.

Barthold, employing a wealth of source material, describes in detail the state of politics under the Samanids and how political necessity

drove Alptagin to seek a secure base at Ghazna away from his rival at the Samanid court. Barthold narrates the politics of the declining years of the Samanid kingdom showing how Subuktigin took advantage of Samanid weakness and the growing intervention of the Qara-Khanids in Transoxiana to establish Ghaznavid authority in Khurasan. A clear and full account of Mahmud's diplomacy and wars *vis-a-vis* the Qara-Khanids is given suggesting that the Indian campaigns should be seen as a vital component of Mahmud's rivalry with the steppe Turks beyond the Jaxartes. Barthold's assessment of Mahmud's achievements is sombre, but it relates not to his alleged excesses in India, but to the welfare of his subjects in Central Asia. Under Mahmud, Barthold believes (pp. 266-7) 'the system of government in the Eastern Muslim lands reached its full development'—the Samanid type of polity, of a partnership between Turkish soldiers of fortune, former slaves, and Persian bureaucrats, with the mass of the people taxpayers but passive onlookers of the rivalries of this political and military elite (pp. 291-2). The common people suffered under Mahmud for he was always in need of money to support his military machine. His magnificent buildings may have been erected with loot from India but they were maintained by local fiscal exactions. Barthold argues (p. 287) that far from being a source of wealth for the mass of the people, the Indian campaigns were a source of ruin. They may have 'yielded vast booty for himself, his guards and the numerous "volunteers" who flocked to him from all parts including Transoxania', but Mahmud needed money in advance for them and this led to 'ruinous imposts'. Mahmud cannot but have understood, says Barthold (p. 289), the link between political and religious conservatism; hence he gave his patronage to the ulama and shaykhs, but only so long as they remained the obedient tools of his policy. Barthold alleges he first supported and then withdrew his support of the Karramite sect for political not religious reasons. Mahmud was not the patron of Persian national aspirations, his military forces 'consisted exclusively of bought slaves and mercenaries; Nizam al-Mulk, desirous that the army should consist of representatives of various nations, quotes Mahmud particularly and his words are entirely corroborated by historical facts 'the religious wars of Mahmud . . . are fully explained by his endeavour to seize the riches of India and there are no grounds for regarding them as due to religious fanaticism'. (pp. 290-291).

Thus in place of rhetoric and declamation, Barthold offered a detailed description of Ghaznavid society and government taken as an organic whole such as no one since Elphinstone had attempted. It cannot be said that subsequent historians writing with an eye upon the history of the sub-continent have fully digested his findings, true or false, much less been able to emulate his detachment or his historical explanation in terms of total situations rather than of individual heroics or individual crimes.

Subsequent British historians of India did not, it appears, feel the need to relate Brown's or Barthold's or for that matter Skrine and Ross' insights to the study of Mahmud's career in India. To modern Muslim and Hindu historians they left a legacy of south Asian-centred-pre-occupation, which their occasional forays into the nomad wastes, as they saw them, of Central Asia did nothing to modify. For Stanley Lane-Poole, *Medieval India under Muhammadan Rule (A.D. 712-1764)*, London, 1903, invasion by the Turks 'was merely the overflow of the teeming cradle-land of Central Asia, the eastern counterpart of those vast migrations of Huns, Turks and Mongols, which from time to time swept over Europe like a locust cloud'. The Muslim Turks only discovered the same road through which the Huns, Scythians and Yavanas had poured into India. Lane-Poole sees Mahmud more as a warrior for the faith, however, whose real store of treasure from his campaigns 'was in his eyes no more than the fit reward of piety; and in the intervals between his forays into heathendom, he would sit down and copy Korans for the health of his soul'. In his zeal for the faith, Mahmud was encouraged by the 'pontifical sanction' of the 'Caliph of Baghdad'. Northern India succumbed through internal divisions—the existence of numerous kingdoms feuding with one another. 'To the contrasts of union and discussion, north and south, race and climate, was added the zeal of the Muslim and the greed of the robber'. Nevertheless, Lane-Poole acknowledges Mahmud did not aim at the occupation of India, though he says this was beyond the forces of Ghazna. Anyway the Turks preferred their home beyond the passes to 'sultry Hindustan'.

Lauding Mahmud as a man of indefatigable energy of mind and body, Lane-Poole deems him no constructive or far-seeing statesman. 'We hear of no laws or institutions or methods of government that

sprang from his initiative. Outward order and security was all he attempted to attain in his unwieldy empire; to organize and consolidate was not in his scheme. He left his dominions so ill-knitted together that they began to fall as under as soon as he was no longer alive to guard them by his vigilant activity'.

Sir William Hunter's (?) account in the *Imperial Gazetteer*, Vol. II, 1908, was in the old narrative tradition while Vincent Smith's *Oxford History of India*, 1919, added little beyond the suggestion that 'the Indian caste system is unfavourable to military efficiency as against foreign foes' and that vigorous 'western' horsemen were always likely to defeat masses of 'eastern' soldiers and elephants.

Sir Wolseley Haig in *The Cambridge History of India*, Vol. III, 1928, *The Cambridge Shorter History of India*, 1934, and in the articles on Mahmud of Ghazna and Ghazna in the first edition of the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Leiden, 1913—42, only re-stated in the course of a narrative treatment, the familiar themes of Mahmud's zeal for plunder which was not incompatible also with a zeal for Islam. In the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Sir Wolseley Haig noted (first edition, p. 157), that Ghaznavid rule was purely military 'with no national force behind it, and in such a case, weakness and domestic feuds must be fatal'.

W. H. Moreland and A. Chatterjee, *A Short History of India*, London, 1936, if adding nothing new at least provided an attractively written presentation of what were now familiar points, e.g., that the Turks came to India as bearers of Perso-Muslim culture, not as savages, and that they were more united socially and politically than those they attacked.

Much the same may be said of J. C. Powell-Price, *History of India*, London, 1955. The Muslims who entered 'India proper' were not the Arabs but a 'less cultured and rougher type', not the original missionaries of the religion of Muhammad but converts of a different race who had received the new light more recently and were more ruthless, Powell-Price says, in thrusting it on all they came into contact with. They were racially the same people who had disturbed India before, akin to the Sakas, the Kushanas, the Huing Nu of the Chinese histories, that conglomeration of people who were Turki speaking tribes of nomads. Generally speaking, says Powell-Price, these Turki

speaking nomads were Aryan in culture. The Arab campaigns in Transoxiana (705—714) introduced them to Islam and they adopted the new religion with avidity. Powell-Price (p. 101) says that the Samanids were the first to start the custom of enlisting their officers from the Turki captives or slaves; the latter, however, became the 'bane' of the Muslim dynasties, leading finally to a slave dynasty in Delhi. Powell-Price recounts the rise of Ghazna from Alptagin's breakaway from the Samanid court, implying that the Caliph's pre-occupation with rival groups of mercenaries and the appearance of the Seljuqs Turks about 985 (Powell-Price is apparently referring to the Qara-Khanids) enabled it to prosper. Subuktigin in this dangerous and fluid situation had to strengthen his kingdom or perish. In this process, a clash with the Hindu-Shahi king Jaipal, was inevitable. Powell-Price goes on to emphasize that Mahmud's aim was to rule the territories of the Samanids and of Baghdad not India, and that he regarded India as a useful place from which to nourish the sinews of war, a treasure house to be looted at will. However, his success in India is explicable partly by the religious fervour of the newly converted pagan and nomad Turks. Rajput disunity and deficient military technique would explain the rest. Thus Powell-Price does attempt to relate Mahmud's exploits in India to his contemporary political and social situation in Central Asia and does to that extent offer an explanation more specific than that of the Central Asian cauldron always ready to boil over into India or of the inevitable Muslim-Hindu confrontation, the predestined clash of two antipathetic ways of life.

Perhaps the earliest history of Mahmud of Ghazna by a Muslim historian writing in the shadow of European historiography, was Zaka-Allah's *Tarikh-i-Hindustan*, published in the 1890's. Using a wide variety of Arabic and Persian sources—for example, Al-Biruni's '*Kitab-al-Hind*', the *Tarikh-i-Baihaqi*, the *Tarikh-i-Yamini*, the *Jawami-al-Hikayat*, the *Habib-al-Siyar*, the *Tarikh-i-Banakati*, the *Tabaqat-i-Akbari*, and Firishta's *Gulshan-i-Ibrahimi*, Zaka-Allah gives a general historical account of the political expansion of Islam and of the rise of the Ghaznavids which, though not analytical, was more rounded than that of many of his British predecessors. He describes the growth of Turkish dominance over Kabul, the extent of Jaipal's dominions, the relevant geography of Hindustan. He includes the Central Asian

activities of Mahmud and gives the religious background to Mahmud's attack upon the Qarmatiya of Multan. Zaka-Allah also comments on the multi-racial composition of Mahmud's empire and army and states that he employed Hindus therein without thought of religion. He regards Mahmud as a 'pukka-mussulman', but in personal observance, not because he broke idols. Zaka-Allah states that the preaching of Islam and the conversion of non-Muslims were not Mahmud's purpose, indeed his military campaigns made the propagation of Islam in Hindustan more difficult. He specifically refers to the errors of European charges of Muslim fanaticism against Mahmud (p. 304). Zaka-Allah points out that Mahmud established a province in the Punjab raising the banners of Islam and building mosques, but outside the Punjab he was an idol-breaker and plunderer. Muslims, however, still regard Mahmud as a wager of *jihad* (p. 287). For Zaka-Allah, however, he should be viewed as an imperialist and great Muslim world figure. Zaka-Allah notes (probably following Elphinstone) that Mahmud was no law giver, adding that he considered the *shari'a* sufficient. In Zaka-Allah's treatment of the Ghaznavids there is a significant hint of the making of a distinction between the political and the religious aspects of Muslim achievement. This may reflect Zaka-Allah's reaction to his own environment where such a distinction was both intellectually respectable, because implicit in nineteenth century western thought, and politically expedient because making for better understanding between newly awakened Hindu and Muslim 'public opinion'.

A Yusuf Ali, *The Making of India*, London, 1925, wrote that he wanted "his countrymen to understand not only the particular section to which they may severally belong, but India as a whole, a living and growing reality that must command our devotion". His approach to Islam is strongly influenced by Amir Ali; he regards it as a religion of social reform (pp. 65-66) and one which brought 'better organization and a manlier culture into India' (p. 81). However, though Mahmud was a professed warrior of Islam and there was no doubt about his iconoclastic zeal 'the presence in the court of Mahmud of men like Al-Biruni shows that even the early Muslim conquests in India went hand in hand with a serious attempt at understanding the mentality of the highest Indian minds and explaining the point of view of the new people who came with a new gospel (*sic.*) and a new social and

political message' (p. 72). Although Mahmud and his successors is seen as introducing a new, and in some ways, a better cultural strain into India, Yusuf Ali did not regard him as creating a Hindu-Muslim political problem which invalidated the concept of a developing Indian territorial nationalism.

Professor Muhammad Habib's *Mahmud of Ghaznin*, Aligarh 1927, is a significant milestone in the history of modern Muslim interpretation of the Ghaznavid invasions. It was published to withstand, Professor Habib says, a recent tendency among Muslims in India to adore Sultan Mahmud as a saint. For Professor Habib, Islam as a creed stands by the principles of the Qur'an and the life of the Prophet. If Mahmud and his officers strayed from the straight path thus defined, so much the worse for them. The period of the ninth to the thirteenth centuries A.D. was not an age of faith in the Muslim world but an age of materialistic civilization. Islam had become a creed for the protection of vested interests, a means for procuring the salvation of the individual soul (p. 2), and was no longer a world-wide force of democratic upheaval. Mahmud's period was devoid of the higher spirit of faith. When men, Professor Habib says, find it difficult to believe in God, they try to prove Him, when they cease to love their neighbour, they attempt to prove that hating him is a moral duty. Professor Habib sees Mahmud as a hero of the old pre-Muslim Persian sort, wielding power without morality, a pioneer of the 'new imperialism'—the first Muslim emperor (p. 71).

Mahmud's campaigns in India were not crusades (*sic.*) but secular exploits waged for the greed of glory and gold (p. 77). The Hindu knew that Mahmud's motives were economic when he plundered their temples. They were infuriated but not surprised. Islam itself sanctioned neither the vandalism nor the plundering motives of the invader (pp. 79-80). Mahmud himself wanted to be a Turko-Persian emperor; a Muslim government in India was impossible without a native Muslim population to support it.

Professor Habib explains the success of the Ghaznavid invasions in terms of the military nature of the Ghaznavid state and of the paralysis which afflicted the Hindus by reason of their social and political customs. They only knew how to die.

For Professor Habib, Mahmud is essentially a Central Asian prince, a Turkish successor to the Persian rulers of the eastern Muslim world (he regards the Abbasids as Persian in spirit, p. 9). The real, that is the spiritual, history of Islam in India begins with the Ghorids and with Shaykh Mu'in-ud-din Chishti (p. 83). 'With the proper history of our country, Mahmud has nothing to do. But we have inherited from him the most bitter drops in our cup. To later generations Mahmud became the arch-fanatic he never was; and in that incarnation he is still worshipped by such Indian Mussulmans as have cast off the teaching of Lord Krishna for this devotion to minor gods. Islam's worst enemies have ever been its own fanatical followers'.

It is perhaps a significant paradox that in his treatment of later Muslim history, Professor Habib masterfully draws a distinction between Islam as a spiritual force and Muslims as successful conquerors, but that in his references to the earliest period of Muslim history, he implies that he accepts that Muslim spiritual insights should have political consequences.

Dr. Muhammad Nazim's *The Life & Times of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna*, Cambridge, 1931, was written in part to exonerate Mahmud 'from the charge of fanaticism so often levelled against him and to show that his wars in India were not the 'haphazard movements of a predatory warrior but were the result of a well-considered programme of conquest and annexation'. Dr. Nazim held that the 'single hearted devotion of the earlier Muslims to the cause of Islam had been replaced by a narrow spirit of self-aggrandisement and lust of power'.

Dr. Nazim chronicles the decline of the 'Abbasids and the rise of the Ghaznavids without suggesting any economic, social or indeed religious reasons for these developments. He gives a full description, area by area, of the expansion of Mahmud's empire but does not analyse that expansion in terms of situation and relate specifically the campaigns in *Hindustan to Mahmud's fortunes as an empire builder in Khurasan and Persia and as a rival to the Qara-Khanids in Transoxiana.*

In Hindustan Mahmud was neither a brigand nor a miracle-monger. His motives were political for he harassed the Muslim rulers of Iran and Transoxiana as much as Hindu rajas. Nevertheless, Dr. Nazim felt that Mahmud's campaigns in some sense represented a confrontation of Hinduism and Islam for he tells us 'the Hindus rejected Islam as their

national (*sic*) religion because of the fundamental and irreconcilable differences between Islam and Hinduism'.

He does not ask how far the interesting data he gives of the former Muslim ruler of Ghazna, Abu Bakr Lawik, and his son Abu 'Ali, being in alliance with the Hindu Shahi ruler against Alptagin's successors at Ghazna, fits the picture of a political, if not a religious, confrontation of the Muslim and the Hindu worlds.

Modern Hindu accounts of Mahmud appear to date from Ishwari Prasad's *History of Mediaeval India*, first ed., Allahabad, 1925 (references are to the second edition, Allahabad, 1928). He traces the by now usual picture of the Turks taking over the eastern caliphate from the Arabs and of the emergence of splinter principalities with Ghazna a break-away from the Samanid state. He states that Alptagin's father had been governor at Chazna before his son's migration there and depicts Subuktigin as using the Afghans to extend his sphere of influence (p. 64). 'Having secured his position in the Afghan hills, Subuktigin, like an orthodox Muslim, eager to acquire religious merit, turned to the conquest of India, a country of idolators and infidels'. He succeeded as his followers were 'fiery and fanatical'. Mahmud added the qualities of a born soldier to his 'boundless religious fanaticism, which ranked him among the great leaders of the Muslim Church (*sic*)'. 'The cultured Arabs and Persians had nothing of the ferocity of temper and iconoclastic zeal, which was a predominant characteristic of the Turks who were utterly devoid of those higher qualities which make up the dignity of man . . . Mahmud was a fierce and fanatical Muslim with an insatiable thirst for wealth and power . . . he formed the grim resolve of spreading the faith of the Prophet at the point of the sword carrying destruction into heathen lands . . . To such a greedy iconoclast India with her myriad faiths and fabulous wealth presented a favourable field for the exercise of his religion and political ambitions, . . . Every expedition against the Hindus amounted to a *jihād* and Mahmud was always backed up by the irresistible vigour and unquenchable ardour of the Turkish hordes who followed him into Industan.

Mahmud's success was made possible by the disunity of the Rajput chiefs and the absence of 'national patriotism' in India. 'The pride of the clan or the tribe interfered with the discipline of the coalition'. The need of defending their hearths and homes drew them together, but

self-interest predominated over the interests of Hindustan'. Ishwari Prasad also remarks upon the divisive effect of caste. 'The heart had gone out of Hinduism and superstition, greed and ignorance had taken the place of learning, piety and philanthropy.

Ishwari Prasad calls Mahmud 'a great king' who utilised his opportunities—the fall of the Samanids, the dissensions of the Hindu princes, the waning power of Persia and the extraordinary zeal of the Turks. But he could not occupy Hindustan permanently—the Turks 'found the sultry climate of India unbearable'. All that Mahmud wanted was to compel the custodians of temples and occupants of thrones, to disgorge to him the vast wealth which they possessed, and when this was done he returned to his native land unmindful of annexation or permanent conquest'.

'To the Mussulmans of his day he was a Ghazi, a champion of the faith who tried to extirpate infidelity in heathen lands. To the Hindus, he is to this day, an inhuman tyrant, a veritable Hun, who destroyed their most sacred shrines and wantonly wounded their religious susceptibilities'. To Ishwari Prasad, however, he is 'a great leader of men, a just and upright ruler according to his own lights, an intrepid and gifted soldier, a dispenser of justice, a patron of letters and deserves to be ranked among the greatest kings of the world'.

But his work did not endure because consolidation did not keep pace with conquest. 'The empire was a huge agglomeration of peoples who could be held in check only by the argus-eyed sultan'.

The vast wealth Mahmud had brought to Ghazna only demoralized 'the brave men who had fearlessly done battle for him'. The court of Ghazna 'became a nursery of weaklings, from whom the sceptre was snatched by those who knew how to wield it'. No evidence for this apparently rhetorical explanation is cited.

C. V. Vaidya's, *History of Medieval India*, Vol. III, *The Downfall of Hindu India*, Poona, 1926, was self-consciously written with an eye on the contemporary struggle against British rule. It seeks to detect those elements in the history of Hindu India which may explain why she has so often succumbed to foreign foes. The rise of Ghazna is related to the rise of the Turks. Subuktigin 'naturally' tried to extend his dominion (p. 23). It is needless to enquire who was the aggressor,

for the law of the brute applied (p. 24). The Ghazanavids were not superior to the Rajputs in arms or bravery but the Hindus were not so resourceful or dogged in fight (p. 48). Vaidya holds that Mahmud achieved a conscious expansion of his territory and solidified his state by forcible conversion (p. 65). His methods were like those of the British—tribute and then absorption. Vaidya discusses whether Mahmud was a bandit. He prefers a policy of plunder to one of annexation (this with an eye on British rule) but unfortunately Mahmud was guilty of both. But his plundering was not banditry as it was done for a political purpose.

Although, says Vaidya, Hindu India was aware of the Ghaznavid menace, it failed to save the Panjab from annexation, not because Hindu kingdoms were individually too small or because there was a difference in systems of government (Vaidya says that there were no ideas of representative government among either the Turks or the Hindus), or because Hindus did not eat meat (Vaidya says the Hindus of the Panjab and Kabul were in fact flesh eaters), but because there was no national unity. The people were politically apathetic, armies were neglected, money was spent on idols rather than upon military equipment and Hindu religious feeling was weak, because Hinduism was relaxing after its recent victory over Buddhism. The Hindus of the Panjab must, says Vaidya, (writing in the nineteen-twenties), strengthen their religious sentiment (p. 128). His specific for a national Hindu revival appears to be 'back to the Vedas'. C. V. Vaidya regards history as a tract for the times, a tract written with a vocabulary drawn from Britain and the west and a grammar derived from the earliest and therefore the healthiest period of Hindu history—India's pure Aryan past.

H. C. Ray, *Dynastic History of Northern India*, Vol. II, Calcutta, 1936, sees a confrontation of Islamic with Hindu power in the Ghaznavid invasions, and explains (p. 1218) the Turkish success largely in terms of 'the vigours and insatiable thirst of the roving and hungry bands of Central Asia, which was strengthened by their own interpretation of Islam and the superior generalship of their leaders'. The Indians were not less brave than the Turks, but they failed to produce a Mahmud or a Mu'izz ud-Din. However, the Hindus were to blame for not appreciating the Turco-Muslim menace and for having a political system in which their only political contract with a

neighbour was one of violence or of combination to destroy a common rival (pp. 1211-1212).

R. C. Majumdar, 'Hindu Reaction to Muslim Invasions', *Potdar Commemoration Volume*, Poona, 1950, regards the Muslim invasions of India as a national crisis of the first magnitude, and the study of what Indians were doing, or left undone, during the five hundred years before the Ghori conquest as 'not only of profound interest in itself' but as 'calculated to demonstrate the inherent strength or weakness of the national character of the Indians'. For five hundred years before the Ghori conquest, the Hindus had, Majumdar believes, lived in imminent peril or at least under the spectre of a Muslim conquest. He is not so much interested in the rise of Ghazna as in Hindu failures. Although the resistance of Jaipal, Anandpal and Trilochanpal was a bright spot in a dark episode, when the Hindu rulers gathered 'to fight the common enemy of their country and religion' Anandpal's offer of help to Mahmud 'emphasised some of the grave defects in our national character' (p. 350). Majumdar accuses the Rajput chiefs of putting their personal prestige first. The conception of a Hindu nationalism 'though certainly not altogether absent, sat very light upon the Indians. Though it might occasionally lead them to heroic efforts and a frenzy of enthusiasm, it never formed a basis of a settled policy of action overriding all petty individual and narrow interests'. Majumdar points out then how Hindus served Mahmud, that they did not end their own internecine wars and that the safety of the 'motherland', the 'vitality and integrity of the nation', 'even the most cherished sentiments for the honour of women and sanctity of religion are most violently outraged without producing a national outcry'. Majumdar ends, 'If this discourse leads to a critical study of India's reaction against foreign invasions in general with a view to finding out some essential national characteristic running through all ages, its object will have been achieved'.

Dr. A. L. Srivastava's *The Sultanate of Delhi*, Agra, 1950, is also written from the standpoint of a conscious Hindu nationalism read back into history. Describing the state of northern India, 'our country', on the eve of the Ghaznavid attacks, he indicts 'our rulers' for neglect of their armies, failure to fortify the north-west frontier, for not keeping in touch with new military tactics and for narrow-minded isolationism,

and for moral and religious degeneration. 'Although outwardly strong, she (India) was unprepared for defending her religion and liberty'.

The rise of Mahmud of Ghazna was an aspect of the rise of the Turks who had 'embraced Islam and possessed all the zeal and narrow mindedness of neophytes. They were intrepid, brave, full of boundless energy and push and thoroughly materialistic in their outlook. Islam had given them a thin veneer [of religiosity. They were inordinately ambitious and their qualities and faults combined to make them eminently fit for founding a big military empire in the east'.

The Hindu Shahi kingdom was an outpost of India in Afghanistan 'which was geographically and culturally a part of India. Politically, too, though not continuously, it had been a province of our country since the days of Chandragupta Maurya in the third century B.C.' It had 'manfully resisted the Arab aggression'. It was inevitable that Jaipal and Subuktigin should clash (indeed one of Alptagin's immediate successors named Pirai had invaded the Panjab before Subuktigin.)

Dr. Srivastava describes Mahmud as intelligent, shrewd, restless and ambitious, with an habitual air of command. He denies Professor Habib's contention that his outlook was essentially secular and that he was not a fanatic, not a man to follow the *ulama* blindly. 'His life and deeds however, demonstrate the fact that he was, without doubt devoted to his religion and that he believed he was serving the cause of Islam in carrying unprovoked war into the territory of Hindu idolators'. Dr. Srivastava quotes 'Utbi as saying that Mahmud preferred to engage in a holy war against Hind to going on an expedition to Sijistan. He was of course also ambitious to expand his empire and was 'fond of wealth as all powerful people are'. 'Besides, being a realist, he might possibly have considered the existence of a hostile Hindu power in his immediate neighbourhood as a menace to his independent existence or, at any rate, to his policy of expansion'. Dr. Srivastava then describes Mahmud's raids as an essay in gigantic destruction and plunder.

In his final estimate of Mahmud, Dr. Srivastava criticizes Professor Habib's contention that Islam does not sanction 'vandalism and atrocities of the type committed by Mahmud' on the ground that a student of history is not concerned with the dogmas of a religion. He has to assess their effect on the conduct and actions of its adherents.

It is an incontrovertible fact that those who were qualified to interpret the principles of Muslim religion, during the life-time of Mahmud and for centuries after his death, held the view that the ruler of Ghazni not only did not depart from strict Islamic principles, but glorified them by his conduct in India'. Dr. Srivastava holds that Mahmud 'forcibly converted hundreds of our unwilling people to Islam'. He was not a ruler of India, though for geographical, military and strategic reasons he did annexe the Panjab. He was not a statesman and 'did little beyond giving his dominions peace and order. No permanent institution and no nation-building activity was associated with his name'. His empire fell asunder after his death. His weakness for wealth was inordinate. Dr. Srivastava agrees with the view that his 'pre-eminence among his contemporaries was due to his ability not to his character'.

The final work to be considered in *The Struggle for Empire* edited by R. C. Majumdar in the *Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan Series*, Bombay 1957. The treatment of Mahmud is found in the Preface by Professor R. C. Majumdar and in the first chapter 'Ghaznavid Invasion' by Dr. R. C. Ganguly. The general setting in which the Ghaznavid invasions are placed is in a transition period 'that marks the end of independent Hindu rule and the beginning of the dominance of Turkish tribes over a large part, if not the whole, of India'. 'Such dominance of foreign peoples, even from the same reign in Central Asia, was no new thing in Indian history'. Both though Turkish conquerors who settled in India were no new experience for India, the essentially different ingredient in the situation this time, was Islam. The new invaders kept generally aloof 'and formed a distinct unit, politically, socially and culturally'. Moreover they drew a number of indigenous people into their ranks. 'The efforts of the Muslim Turks to obtain a permanent footing in India and the resistance which the Hindus offered or failed to offer, to avoid this great catastrophe (of the intrusion of Islam and its existence as a separate unit) form the subject-matter of this volume' (p. xliv).

Professor Majumdar notes the advantages the Ghaznavids possessed over the Arabs in Sind in having a base much nearer to India and in having distinguished generals in Subuktigin and Mahmud. On the other hand India 'lacked any powerfully organized empire like that of the Pratiharas and Rashtrakutas'. Once the heroic resistance of

the Hindu Shahi kingdom collapsed, India was wide open to 'the horrors of barbarian invasions, fired with the fanatical zeal for demolishing idols and temples, born of the crusading spirit of Islam'. 'It was a tragedy big with future consequences. Not only was India drained of enormous wealth and manpower, but, what was far worse, the Muslims obtained a permanent footing in the Punjab which commanded the highway to the interior'. 'But a still more sublime tragedy was the comparative indifference of the Indian chiefs to this growing menace'. Professor Majumdar finds it strange that the powers of the Duccan continued 'petty domestic quarrels and dissensions' despite the ominous news from the north. 'Such incidents give a rude shock to the idea of the fundamental unity in India'.

Dr. Ganguly's chapter on the invasions themselves follows familiar lines. It runs briefly over the rise of the Tahirids, Saffarids and Samanids to the latter's destruction at the hands of the 'Ilak Khans of Turkistan' who inherited the Samanid dominions north of the Oxus. Their possessions south of the Oxus passed into the hands of the Yamini dynasty who repeatedly invaded India. Dr. Ganguly gives (pp. 2-3) a more detailed account than usual of events between Alptagin's death and the accession of Subuktigin and, utilizing Dr. Nazim's work, mentions an alliance between the descendants of the Muslim ruler of Ghazna whom Alptagin had dispossessed and the Hindu Shahi king. Although Mahmud's other activities in Central Asia are mentioned, the bulk of Dr. Ganguly's account of the reign is devoted to his campaigns in India which are chronicled in some detail. Dr. Ganguly acknowledges Mahmud's qualities as a military leader, but 'his iconoclastic zeal and avarice, beyond measure, which figure so conspicuously in his Indian expeditions, inevitably loom large in Indian eyes and all his great qualities pale into insignificance'. By his ruthless destruction of temples and images he violated the most sacred and cherished sentiments of the Indian people, and his championship of Islam therefore merely served to degrade it in their eyes as nothing else could (p. 22). (Dr. Ganguly does not however say that Islam teaches plunder and conquest or by its beliefs at least encourages it.) The exhaustion of India's economic resources and manpower told on the future political destiny of India. The destruction of the Hindu Shahi kingdom 'which barred the gates of India against foreign invaders, dealt a severe blow to its future independence It was no longer a

question of whether, but when, that mighty flood would overwhelm the country as a whole'. (p. 22).

It will perhaps be useful now to draw attention to the principal characteristics of the historical writing which has been reviewed.

On the one hand, European historians not principally concerned with South Asian history see Mahmud as essentially a figure in Central Asian rather than in South Asian history. For D'Herbelot, Deguignes, Swinton, Gibbon, Skrine and Rose, Barthold, Mahmud's Indian campaigns, if not incidental to, were strictly subordinate to his Central Asian activities. For them the lines are clearly drawn between Central Asian history as an intelligible unit of study and the history of Hindustan as an intelligible unit of study. On the other hand, for most historians writing from the viewpoint of the history of the sub-continent, the dividing line is equally clear. Mahmud is seen as a foreign invader, but the latest in the long succession of Central Asian conquerors who have descended upon India through the north-western passes. British historians from Orme onwards are of decisive significance in the formation and development in modern times of this concept which is eagerly taken up (if indeed it needed to be taken up) by modern Hindu and Muslim historians. Somewhere in Afghanistan (depending on the point of view) the frontiers, political and cultural, between Central Asia and India are to be clearly drawn, with 'we' to the east and south and 'they' to the west and north, or the reverse. No one doubted that such clear dividing lines existed and were known by contemporaries to exist, however differently the principle of division or of different identity may be conceived.

It is noteworthy that most historians writing from a British, a Hindu or a Muslim point of view are vague, inaccurate and often purely rhetorical in their descriptions of the character of the Ghaznavid polity, its military forces and the society supporting it. Orme tells us nothing; Gibbon little more, although elsewhere in the *Decline and Fall* he evinces great interest in nomadism as an historical phenomenon and by calling Mahmud a Turk and the Seljuqs Turkmans, he implies an awareness that Mahmud's empire was not a simple nomad empire of herdsmen in search of pasture. For Maurice, Mahmud was a member of 'the barbarous race of Tartars'. Mill and Gleig see him as one of those Muslim Turks of the tribe of Tartars who have taken over the eastern caliphate. Of the historians of India, Elphinstone stands

out for his attempt to analyse Ghaznavid society in more detail, pointing out the differences between nomad and slave Turks who have been domesticated in the Muslim world and trying to characterise the role of the Turks in Islam. He also describes the social composition of the very different elements in the government and shows that the Ghaznavid onslaught was not a Turkish, still less a nomadic Turkish onslaught as such. These insights are lost sight of in Talboys Wheeler who speaks of a collision between two races, the Turks and the Hindus. H. G. Keene, Lane-Poole, Sir Wolseley Haig (*Combridge History of India*), indeed all succeeding British historians of India, ignore Elphinstone's work in this respect. They also fail to utilize that of Barthold even when it became available in the English version of 1928. Nor are Muslim or Hindu historians in much better case. Professor Habib certainly shows more interest and insight into the character of Ghaznavid society than most and emphasizes the Persian ethos of Mahmud's court. Dr. Nazim notes the mixed racial composition of Mahmud's army but does not reflect on the significance of this for the character of the empire as a whole (and he had the advantage of writing after the appearance of Barthold's *Turkestan*). Hindu historians regard Mahmud's empire as Turkish, but without specifying what that meant in the contemporary Central Asian situation.

For most historians, Mahmud finds his proper place, that is, his most significant place, in a story of the dramatic confrontation of Muslim conquerors and Hindu conquered, or of Islam triumphant over prostrate Hinduism. Most historians assume that the terms 'Muslims' and 'Islam' are interchangeable. It is noteworthy that no historian of South Asia specifically addresses himself to the issue whether or not Mahmud's behaviour in India was in conformity with *fiqh* teaching on *jihād*, *jizya* or *ghanima* or *zimmis*. Uniquely, Professor Habib addresses himself to the question of whether Islam in fact justified Mahmud's invasions. But on the basis of an interpretation of the original spirit of Islam rather than on the basis of *fiqh* teaching contemporary with Mahmud. Mahmud's invasions are seen as elements in a political and religious contest between Hindu and Muslims and their respective religions. Orme, Maurice and Mill, Gleig and Elphinstone saw the history of South Asia in these terms, long before the experience of 1857 could have suggested the political expediency, from a British point of view, of stressing divisions and differences between the peoples of the sub-

continent. When eighteenth and early nineteenth century British historians looked at the history and the society of the sub-continent, they saw a Muslim ruling elite, clan or nation (the nomenclature varies) over and against a ruled Hindus society, with Mahmud as a principal agent in the transition from Hindu—to Muslim—dominated India. The cultural and the political developments of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries only tend to freeze this periodization, this schema, more solidly than ever into a dogma accepted by all historians of the sub-continent of whatever background.

Perhaps as a consequence of this periodization and this picture of general history, historians have rarely looked at both Ghaznavid and Rajput society together, as indivisibly joined in the one historical process. Some historians have looked at the Ghaznavid background in more detail, others at the Rajput, but rarely at both in integral relationship. It is interesting to note that the use by historians writing in English, of Al-Biruni to describe Indian society in Mahmud's day begins in the nineteen—twenties. (Sachau's English translation of the 1887 printed text appeared in 1910). Zaka-Allah, however, had used the original in *Tarikh-i-Hindustan*, a generation before. But those who have used Al-Biruni have not at the same time used Barthold on Central Asia, still less undertaken an independent investigation.

The dominant *genre* in historical writing on Mahmud has been the political narrative. The dominant mystique has been the political mystique. For this, British rule and the effects of British rule, if not the British historiographical tradition in India are largely responsible. Nineteenth century British historians saw Muslims, if not as present rivals for empire in India, at least as predecessors in empire. The history of the Muhammadan period was the history of the previous set of foreign conquerors and rulers of India, not the history of Islamic civilisation in India in its religious and cultural aspects, still less the history of the sub-continent, taken in the round, under Muslim influence. 'Native' society was unprogressive and low in the scale of civilization—a spectacle of human weakness if not of human depravity. Some British historians delighted to chronicle Muslim conquest and plunder in India if only to conclude that British rule was better. The history of Asia and of South Asia before the rise of British power was but the ante-room to the British-built halls of enlightenment and progress; one did not

need to dwell upon other than the bloodthirsty episodes; believing that their fellow-countrymen were making the history of the sub-continent without the participation of 'native' society at large, British historians tended to assume that earlier conquerors had also made history, whether in Central Asia, or in South Asia, without the participation of 'native' society at large. Some Muslim historians too, proud of Muslim political achievements, similarly concentrated upon Muslim political and military deeds to the exclusion of everything but a somewhat deprecatory glance at the stage and setting of those deeds.

But British political attitudes towards India, visible in the work of Talboys Wheeler, Keene, Wolsely Haig, for example, do not provide the whole explanation. Additional explanation must be sought in the nineteenth century British historical tradition (or what writers on Indian history considered that tradition to be, by no means precisely the same thing). Macaulay, Froude, Freeman and Seeley celebrated England's greatness depicting that greatness as political. Moreover, mid-nineteenth century Protestant and mid-nineteenth century liberal and utilitarian thought conspired together to place the individual rather than society at the centre of the historical process. Individual man was seen as free to choose rationally his own goals, and as fully responsible for his own actions. History was the outcome of conscious choice and rational decision and political history was the record of the outcome of that conscious choice and rational decision. For the utilitarian John Stuart Mill, the laws of the phenomenon of society can be nothing but the laws of the actions and passions of individual human nature. The passions for discussing history in terms of morality, of personal right-doing or personal wrong-doing dominated the English historical scene until late in the nineteenth century. Society was the compresence of free and morally autonomous individuals and history the arena of great men—those who were if anything freer and morally more autonomous than their fellows.

Theories of historical action which sought to underline not merely the social limitations upon but also the social origin of individual choice and action were slow to seize hold of the British historical consciousness. In the analyses of 'condition' of the 'structure' or society, of 'the forces of circumstance', of 'tendencies', of the system of necessity which the past imposes upon even the most gifted and vigorous of individuals—in which, to quote Professor Butterfield 'Society is not merely a

picture of still life, or a kind of background to the story which is being told' but 'an active collaborator in the work of history making'—German and continental rather than British scholars led the way.

This is not the place to write the history of this intellectual development, but Hegel's philosophy of the unreality of separateness, his view that nothing is completely real except the whole; Marx's, 'It is not the consciousness of man that determines his existence—rather it is his social existence that determines his consciousness'; the revolution in sociology associated with Max Weber, Durkheim and Pareto—the visualizing of society as a nexus of groups with the pattern of behaviour which these groups unwittingly established determining men's actions, the treatment, for example, of religion as a social phenomenon with the ethical code of different religions having different effects upon political and economic conduct: these are among the highlights of the story. Waitz, Roth, Fustel de Coulanges, (German and French scholars of feudalism). The Swiss Jacob Burckhardt *The Culture of the Renaissance in Italy*, 1860), Hippolyte Taine (1828-92) and Karl Lamprecht (1856-1915) provided a more organic historical treatment of the whole life of society, its institutions and its economies.

British historiography in the later nineteenth century certainly did not remain set in a purely political and narrative mould. Tout, Pollock, Buckle, F.W. Maitland, Acton and J.B. Bury deepened and enriched the whole British historical tradition with their studies of institutions, of law and ideas in organic relationship to the whole life of a society or of an age. It would be true, however, to add that the work of these scholars had little or no effect upon British historiography on India partly perhaps because British-Indian historical writers tended to be administrators and linguists of strong practical interests and biases who had not spent their time as undergraduates, or their more mature working lives, as academic historians in close touch with the latest currents of thought and practice among professional British or continental historians. There was little, therefore, in the Indo-British historiographical tradition to encourage or induce Hindu and Muslim scholars from the nineteen-twenties onwards, to transcend that political approach to the medieval period which appealed strongly to them in any event for reasons of contemporary politics.

Even today, judging from the reading recommended for the various

courses in European and English history at the universities in both Pakistan and India, it is doubtful whether the immense broadening of the scope of historical study in Europe in the period between the two world wars, that is, in the period immediately preceding independence (the choice of period is somewhat arbitrary), has been fully perceived. The work of the Pirennes, Claphams, Ashworths, Namiers, Blochs, Sees, Croces, Toynbees and Butterfields, to mention but a few, is still not widely known.

What of present and future trends in the study of Mahmud of Ghazna and his times? C. E. Bosworth has recently (*Der Islam*, Oct. 1960) put 'Ghaznavid Military Organization' under the microscope; he suggests (p. 73) that further work is necessary on assignments under the Ghaznavids. According to R. N. Frye, 'Soviet Historiography on the Islamic Orient', *Historians of the Middle East*, ed. Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt, London, 1962, p. 373, the Ghaznavid state finds little place in Soviet investigations, although much has apparently been done in Russian on Samanid and Qara-Khanid society particularly in the elucidation of the meaning of such terms as *iqta'*, *shakir*, and *dihqan* (Frye, *op. cit.* p. 374). Soviet archival and archaeological studies in Central Asia are at present in a high state of organization.

Without some weakening in the present attitude in both India and Pakistan that Mahmud's invasions are somehow a commentary upon the relative merits of Hinduism and Islam, a test case in the story of Hindu-Muslim relations, unless the religious difference is assumed, for the purposes of historical study, to be a historical phenomenon requiring the same historical technique on other historical phenomenon—economic, social and military—it is improbable that Indian or Pakistani historians will see the Ghaznavid empire in any dimension significantly different from the present. The mutual pre-occupations of the British, of Muslims and of Hindus in modern times have made it difficult to develop awareness of other than the surface political and religious phenomenon. Are we sure that the society ruled by the Hindu-Shahis and the society ruled by Subuktigin was in social and racial composition, in the relation of the military to the tax-paying and productive classes, so very different? Are we right, in the light of references to a political relationship between Abu Bakr Lawik and the Hindu Shahi kingdom, to assume an eternal Hindu-Muslim hostility in 'Afghanistan'? Can the apparent disunity of Rajput India be a

sufficient explanation for Ghaznavid success when the eastern Muslim world appears equally disunited and given to 'internecine warfare'? What were the limits imposed by the social structure of Central Asia and northern India taken together upon the raising and the maintaining of military forces and did Mahmud's dominions in Central Asia possess advantages in this respect denied to Rajput India? What was the character of the group feeling, of the loyalty which held the armies of Mahmud together while he lived, but which apparently failed his successor Mas'ud? How did Turks in service regard nomad Turks? Has Barthold said the last work on the relations between the non-political and non-military classes and their political and military overlords? Was there any 'social' mobility between the two classes? Are we sure that society in Central Asia was in fact socially more mobile than society in Hindustan? In the field of technology, both economically productive and military technology, did Mahmud's empire enjoy significant advantages—or was both Ghaznavid and Indian society at about the same level of technique? Similarly with the problem of economic organization. Have considerations of geography and communications been given sufficient weight—in explaining, for example, Mahmud's *modus vivendi* with the Qara-Khanids in Transoxiana or the political prominence of Ghazna for such a comparatively short time in the history of the general zone of Afghanistan? In raising these questions one is only too aware of the difficulties of answering them with the evidence at our command; but to quote Professor Butterfield in another context, 'What I wish most of all to secure is that, on certain topics, we should at least not close our minds too soon'.

The Razakar Movement in Hyderabad

“On the political chessboard of Hyderabad was played a game which rivetted for a time the attention of the whole country. What was the game, who were the players and what stakes did they play for are matters which are still shrouded in a mist of general ignorance”. Very few people have any clear idea about the struggle for independence which was ensued by the Muslims of Hyderabad for nearly two decades and which, in the end, met with a sudden and tragic collapse. It was a tragedy which affected not only the Muslims of the state or of the sub-continent, but its repercussions were felt on the Hindus of the State as well. Mrs. Sarojini Naidu, the Governor of the United Provinces, when the news of the fall of Hyderabad, was conveyed to her is reported to have burst into tears before a group of Journalists, and cried out in grief ‘Ah my country’.¹

The fall of Hyderabad was the fall of the Muslims of the state. With the extinction of the Asif Jahi dynasty, which had ruled over Hyderabad for nearly two hundred years the even last remnant of the Great Mughals was wiped out of the political scene of India. Though the Muslims of India emerged as a new nation in the newly established state of Pakistan, the Muslims of Hyderabad having failed in their cause of preserving the independence of Hyderabad as a Muslim state, were ruined both materially and mentally. They were completely suppressed. Nature had been unkind to them. They tried very hard, to persevere their intity but they lacked those very qualities which the so called “Mutineers” of 1857 had also lacked, and they were bound to fail, and they failed miserably. Their failure brought misery, dishonour and hardships to all, and peace to none. Indian Union may think the Government of India came as saviours of the people—they may have been even acclaimed as such, but in this they only deceive themselves. What they did achieve, and what has been admitted by leading Hindu leaders like Pandit Sunder Lal and Narsing Rao, was large scale murder, arson and rape, committed on a defenceless community.

1. An Article on Hyderabad, by Zia-ul-Hasan, Mosur, Published in an Urdu Daily of Karachi-Hurriyat dated, 11th December, 1962.

The end of Hyderabad was also the end of the dreams of the Indian Mussalmans who had looked on Hyderabad as a place of refuge where they could get shelter and security with open arms if and when the need arose. But in the hour of their misfortunes, the Muslims of Hyderabad stood alone. Even their own sovereign betrayed them. Their point of view was also not understood by the outsiders. To make matters worse, the press played a prominent part in the misleading public opinion in British India. Thousands of newspaper reports, statements, interviews and articles were published, which if credited, would lead one to the irresistible conclusion that Muslim rule in Hyderabad was tyrannical, autocratic and oppressive for the Hindu majority. The Majlis-i-Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen was a communal minded organization aiming at the complete annihilation of the Hindus of the state;² and the Razakars were a 'shock brigade', organized by the Majlis-i-Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen as a means of carrying out their programme of establishing a 'theocratic and totalitarian State'.³

People outside Hyderabad held fantastic ideas about the Razakars and their activities. Some condemned them as a destructive communal minded force, which was a menace to the prosperity of the state; while others eulogised them as the defenders of the helpless Muslims. There were still others who thought that they were a part of the State's regular army.

The Razakars, were a voluntary organisation under Majlis-i-Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen. They were an important part of the independence movement of the Hyderabad Muslims. In the later years of the independence movement, they proved to be the only agency of the Majlis through which it worked out its programme and by which, it defended the scanty Muslim population of the state against the onslaughts of the communal minded majority. Like the National Guards of the French Revolution they gained so much importance in the course of time that they not only roused the slumbering people of the state to the dangers of an Indian invasion, but by their rallies, and the imposing personality of their leaders Bahadur Yar Jung and Syed Qasim Rizvi, eloquent utterances, and organized propaganda, they

2. V. P. Menon, the Story of the Integration of the Indian States, p. 321.

3. Ibid.

created a lot of interest outside Hyderabad too amongst the Muslims of the subcontinent.

The population of Hyderabad was predominantly Hindu, the ratio of Hindu to Muslim population being approximately 86 : 14. Although the Hindu Mahasabahists accused the Muslim rulers of Hyderabad, of adopting a policy which was aimed at making the state 'a theocratic Muslim State', it is interesting to note that inspite of six hundred years of Muslim rule, the Hindus of the state could claim such a "thumping majority leaving the ruling and so called privileged class in a miserable minority"⁴.

As a matter of fact the Muslim rulers of Hyderabad, following in the footsteps of the great Mughals, practised a policy of toleration towards the non-Muslims of the state. There is not a single instance of a Nizam being a bigot. It was the only state in India which exhibited to the world a spectacle of complete communal harmony, mutual tolerance and goodwill between the two major communities.⁵

Mir Usman Ali Khan, Nizam VII's statement which he issued in 1352 of Hijri era,⁶ may be cited in support of this :

"Whatever may be the religion of my house and my own personal belief, I am, as a Ruler, the follower of another religion as well, which must be characterized as 'love towards all'; because under me live people of different faiths and different communities and the protection of their houses of worship has for long been part of the constitution of my state. I do not desire, therefore, to injure with narrow-mindedness the susceptibilities of any community or faith or to distort the practice of my own religion in such a manner as to earn the title of a bigot. It has throughout been my principle and that of my forefathers

4. Abdus Salam, "The how, why and wherefore of the Hyderabad struggle" p. 1.

5. Birggs, Gribble and General Frazer pay glowing tributes to the kings of the Asif Jahi dynasty for following a policy of toleration and love towards the Hindus. Mr. Krishnaswami Mudiraj and Rosita Forbes, the author of "India of the Princes" also Praise Mir Usman Ali Khan for his benevolence towards the Hindus.

6. Sheikh Yaqub Ali, Hayat-i-Usmani, p. 298.

to look upon all religions without difference or distinction, and to cause no weakening of our rule by interference in the practice of any religion. In my capacity of a ruler, I consider myself to be without any religion, not in the sense of being an atheist but in the sense of being without bias as a Ruler for or against any particular religion or community. In that faith, I and my forefathers have taken just pride and will continue to do so, and I trust that my descendants will also, God willing, follow the same principle".⁷

The Nizam used to spend several lakhs of rupees annually on the maintenance and upkeep of several thousand temples within his dominions. But his detractors characterised it as a 'necessary and unavoidable evil'.

There was hardly any Indian state or British Indian province which, judged by its finances, internal progress, its industrial, educational and social, achievements, and its spirit of complete communal harmony, could stand comparison with Hyderabad.

Mr. Date, the author of the 'Bhaganagar struggle', and the most virulent opponent spoke of him as a man of 'restless energy', simple in habits but possessing high ideals for extending his beneficial rule to all his subjects—irrespective of any caste or creed.

Living under an enlightened and a progressive ruler, the people of the state, for a long time did not feel the necessity or the urge for having a representative government. But Hyderabad could not remain unaffected by the conditions prevailing in British India, where the national movement was in full swing. The Hindus of Hyderabad were soon affected by the Communal virus which was fouling the stream of national life.

In nineteen thirties, the communalists turned their attention to Hyderabad—which rankled in their eyes as the only state presenting to the world, a spectacle of the bygone glories of Muslim rule.

Communal organizations like the Arya Samaj and the Hindu Mohasabah, started agitating. This agitation was as sudden as it

7. Abdus Salam, The How, Why and Wherefore of the Hyderabad Struggle, pp. 4-5.

was unexpected. It was conceived in British India by men who surrendered to sentiments and who built up their plans on the rumours regarding the alleged repression of the Hindus in the Nizam's dominions. These agitations, writes Mr. Abdus Salam, 'were in the nature of epidemics contracted from outside. There was no disease in the body politic of the state to warrant their existence. They came, spent themselves and were gone leaving behind a few traces of their evil visitation.'⁸

Both the Arya Samaj and Hindu Mahasabha, as institutions were initiated and organized in the state, by the British Indian subjects. Both had for their object the social, religious, economic and political regeneration of the Hindus.⁹ The government of Hyderabad in the beginning had no quarrel with them, welcomed them thinking that they would help the government in uplifting of the Hindu masses. But they soon proved to be destructive rather than constructive forces creating disaffection between class and class which finally resulted in the breach of public peace and agitation against the Government.¹⁰

The Arya Samaj was introduced in Hyderabad in 1932 in Udgir in district Bidar, where it had its central organization known as the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha, with branches in different parts—eighteen in the capital city alone.¹¹ In the beginning its principal functions were to hold 'periodical congregations, organize processions, establish Akharas and employ missionaries for Shudhi and Sangathan work'—but in the course of time they slowly changed their programme and went beyond the sphere of religious and social reform and developed violent political and communal tendencies. The government was compelled to put an end to their activities and they were dealt with a strong hand.¹² They were completely suppressed in the district of Bidar, but the germs were transferred to Latur in district of Usmanabad.

In this context, it is worth mentioning that just as the history of Europe had a profound influence on the history of Anglo-French

8. Abdus Salam, 27.

9. Ibid, Also see *Tarikh i-Majlis-i-Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen* by Salim Gandhri and Syed Shabbar Hatmi.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid, Also see *Hyderabad Administration*, by Mr. Aney.

struggle in India, in the same way the politics of British India affected the politics of Hyderabad in every way, at this time. There is enough evidence to believe that Indian elements deliberately encouraged unrest in Hyderabad with the idea of providing opportunities for the miscreants who were raiding Hyderabad from bases in India to take advantage of the discontentment prevailing in the state, and to indulge in their nefarious work.¹³

This policy was given a further impetus by the introduction of the Government of India Act of 1935. The two most important clauses of the this Act were (1) formation of an Indian federation comprising the British Indian provinces and the Indian states (2) the introduction of provincial autonomy. The Government found it difficult to put the former clause into practice, but it was able to execute the latter. By 1937, the Indian National Congress had also, accepted the Act of 1935 and in seven provinces Congress Governments were formed. This fact encouraged the Hindus, and profoundly influenced the activities of the subversive elements in the state. Following the political ideology of the Congress, the forces of agitation started a planned and organized campaign against the ruler of Hyderabad. Although the Indian National Congress had from time to time denied any participation or encouragement on their part to these forces, the activities of the state congress in Hyderabad go a long way to prove that they were definitely supported by them.¹⁴ They were further encouraged by the declaration made by the Prime Minister of Hyderabad to the effect that responsible Government would be introduced in the state, for the implementation of which he had appointed a committee under the chairmanship of Mr. Aiyangar to submit a report to the Government on the question of granting reforms. This announcement came as a boon to the Hindus, and they took full advantage of it.

After 1935, the Arya Samajists started open agitation. 'Armed processions, law breaking and defiance of orders, organized subversive propaganda, creating disaffection against the state and racial hatred

12. See White paper on Arya Samaj Movement in Hyderabad, published by the Government of Hyderabad.

13. Hyderabad's Relations with the Dominion of India prepared by the Government of H. E. H. the Nizam of Hyderabad and Berar VIII, p. 15.

14. See Tarikh-i-Majlis-i-Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen, also see Abdus Salam.

among the different communities, living in the Dominion, offensive preaching against other religions and communities, and active subversive agitation against the state, both within and without,—these were some of the conspicuous activities of the Arya Smajists.¹⁵ As a result several communal riots followed in quick succession in Latur and in adjoining areas, especially in the villages,¹⁶ in which thousands of Muslims perished.

These riots awakened the Muslims to the danger which loomed over their heads. Consequently, a Muslim organization was formed in Latur for the purpose of self-defence only. It was named as Anjuman-i Dafa-i-Muslimeen, and branches of it were opened in the districts of Bidar, Usmanabad and Paigah Gangoti. The object of this organisation was to provide means of defence to the scanty Muslim population of the villages. They were even provided secretly with weapons to fight the aggressors. This organization latter gave rise to the future Razakar movement.

In 1938, the Muslims of the capital city also realized the danger that was threatening them from every corner. They felt the need for a closer union between all sections of the Muslims and for the first time they thought in terms of taking an active part in the politics of the country. They rightly thought that they would be completely wiped out of Hyderabad if they remained passive any longer. Instead of a new organization, they changed the character of the Majlis-i-Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen, from religious to a political organization. It soon became the only representative body of the Muslims in Hyderabad State.

Majlis-i-Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen was inaugrated in 1927, by a group

15. Abdus Salam, p. 31. Mr. Abdus Salam gives a good account of the activities of the Arya Samajists in Hyderabad. Also see Tarikh-i-Majlis-i-Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen.

16. It is interesting to note that these communal riots were confined to the districts and the villages, where the Muslims being in miserable minority could not defend themselves against the onslaughts of the majority. Mr. Abdus Salam has rightly defined the anti-Muslim agitation in Hyderabad as resembling to the story of the wolf who, being determined to eat the lamb, but not wanting to appear high-handed, said to the latter, "I am going to kill you because you abused me two years ago", The lamb looked surprised and said: "I was not even born at that time", "Then it must have been your father", said the wolf' add proceeded to his nefarious work, p. 26.

of Muslims with a view to bring about unity among the different sections of the Muslims of Hyderabad by removing all difference, dividing them. It was by no means apolitical party, its aim being to bring the Muslims closer to one another. It consisted of leaders of all sections of the Muslim population of the state¹⁷, who occasionally held meetings in private houses to discuss means of meeting the situation created by militant Hindu nationalism. Politics never formed a part of their deliberations. Maulana Band-e-Hassan, Maulana Hakim Maqsood Ali, Maulana Sabir Hussaini and Maulvi Mahmood Nawaz Khan were some of the leading Musalmans who took a prominent part in these meetings¹⁸. This organization was first named as Majlis-i-Ittehad-bain-ul-Muslimeen—however, later on, in 1928, the word 'Bain' was removed and its name was modified to its present form.¹⁹

The main aim of the Majlis as said before, was to create unity among the Muslims of the state and safeguard their interests in the educational, cultural and economic fields of their life. It had not yet entered into the political arena, nor was it directed against the non-Muslims of the state as thought by many Hindus²⁰. The only time it raised its voice in defence of the Muslims was in December 1932, when Vaman Naik a Sabhaist accused the Government of the Nazim of discriminating against the Hindus of the State. It was maintained by him that the majority was being crushed by the privileged minority. It was on this occasion that the Majlis issued a pamphlet to the effect that the declaration of Vamana Naik was directed to harm the communal harmony in the state. It was regretted that the sabhaists were exploiting the situation by publishing wrong statments and attributing them to the Government.²¹

Apart from this pamphlet which was issued by the Majlis, one does not find any other poblical or Communal move on the part of the Majlis which might prove that it was a political or even semi-political organization. During all this period Maulvi Mahmood Nawaz Khan was its president.

17. Tarikh-Majlis-i-Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen, pp. 33-34.

18. Ibid.

19. Tarikh-Majlis-Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen, p. 34 ; for details see pp. 35—37.

20. See Hyderabad-ki-Awami Jung, by C. M. Rady for a History of the Majlis.

21. Tarikh Majlis-i-Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen p. 37, for details see pp. 37—44. ,

As mentioned earlier, it was in 1938 that the Muslims of the state realized for the first time the dangers of remaining passive in politics, especially after the announcement made by the Prime Minister of Hyderabad about the introduction of reforms in the state. The use were several anti-Muslim Hindu organizations in the state, there was no organization to represent and safeguard Muslim interests. A meeting was held by the Majlis under the presidentship of Maulana Abdul Qadeer Siddiqi, Head of the Department of Islamiyat, Usmania Univeristy, on 14th Feberuary 1938, in which a political clause was added to the constitution of the Majlis. From there on, began the struggle for the preservation and continuance of the Asif Jahi dynasty which was the symbol of Muslim supremacy, and by which alone the Muslims could hope to exist in the state.

It is wrong to think like Mr. C. M. Reddy and many other Hindu writers that the Majlis was a reactionary body working against the high principles of Democracy. Democracy can be a very dangerous form of government if the majority is poisoned with communalism as was the case in British India and of which, the Muslims of Hyderabad had enough experience to expect the same in their own state if the majority rule was introduced. Under such circumstances, it was safe to continue with monarchy, rather that abolish it, for monarchy alone could bring prosperity to the state by keeping the two major communities at peace.

With its entrance into the political arena, the Majlis undertook the tremendous task of creating political consciousness among the Muslim masses. This difficult task of rousing them fell to the lot of Bahadur Yar Jung, when he came to the helm of affairs. A man of a 'magnificent personality with charming manners and strong commonsense- and an Urdu orator of the highest order with unsurpassable fluency'—he soon became the idol of not only Hyderabad Muslims but of the Muslims of the whole undivided India. Musalmans must unite and claim their legitimate share in the political life of the country was the basis of his programme. He succeeded wonderfully in achieving this object and soon the government had to sit up and take notice of what the Ittehad said and did.

He next diverted his attention to further strengthening communal harmony which was the characteristic of Hyderabad and which was being

endangered by new proposed political and constitutional changes. The State congress, the Arya Samajists and the Sabhaists, who had been spreading uneist in the state for a long time now started satyagrah and in consequence several communal riots took place. The severest of them broke out in Dhoolpet, in Hyderabad proper in 1939, in which many Muslims perished including two of Bahadur Yar Jung's nephews. Bahadur Yar Jung appointed a commission of the Majlis to tour the provinces especially in Marathwara and to report on the conditions prevailing there. Syed Qasim Rizvi, who later on became the President of the Majlis and who played a very prominent part in the last days of the struggle, submitted a report on the conditions existing in the districts. After studying the report, it was considered necessary that branches of the Majlis should be opened in every part of the state and recommended that the Razakar movement should be introduced in to all places to counteract the activities of the anti-Muslim elements. The other thing which the Majlis thought essential at this stage was to acquaint the public opinion in British India with the viewpoint of the Hyderabad Muslims. Consequently the case of the Muslims of the state was presented by Nawab Bahadur Yar Jung and Maulvi Ahmad Abdullah al Masdoosi at the All Indian Muslim League session held at Patna in 1939²². So the Muslims of British India felt a kind of sympathy for the Muslims of Hyderabad, and realized that the struggle of the Hyderabad Muslims was not different from their own struggle. And when on January 22nd 1932, the Arya Samajists organized an All India Hyderabad Day, the Muslims of British India took up the cause of their brethern.

While discussing the history of the Majlis, it would be interesting to say a word or two about the working of the Majlis also. It was divided in three units-viz.

(1) Primary Majlis.

(2) District Majlis and

(3) Central Majlis.

The Primary Majlis, which was the smallest unit, consisted of the 100 members, and was confined to villages only. Village where 100

22. I am very grateful to Maulvi Ahmad Abdullah al-Masdoosi for providing me with details about his participation in the All India Muslim League session at Patna, along with Bahadur Yar Jung, to present the case of the Hyderabad Muslims.

members could not be collected, could form units in collaboration with other villages. Every Primary Majlis had a right to send one member to a district Majlis and the District Majlis elected from amongst their own members their quota for the central Majlis. The representatives of districts formed the central Majlis. Every Majlis had a president of its own. The Razakars were under the authority and supervision of the Central Majlis²³.

The danger from Communalists was confined mostly to Marathwara. Telingana and Karnatik were not affected so badly. So the Razakar movement, in the beginning was more active in Marathwara than in other parts of the state—though later on it was extended to other areas also. Politically, the Razakars, as said before, were under the Majlis. 'but in regard to their operations they were commanded by a Salar. They were provided with arms by the Central Majlis.

Between 1939-40 the communist movement became organized in Telingana and started its activities in the adjoining areas. It was a destructive movement—which refused reconciliation with any opposition and riots followed in quick succession. As the aim of the communists of creating unrest in the country was identical to that of the Arya Samajists, communalism was dragged in too—with the result that in Telingana, communism and communalism formed a combined force against the Muslims. So while in Marathwara, the Muslims had to face the communalists, in Telingana they had to face both the communists and the communalists—and in both the places their only hope and support were the Razakars.

In 1942, the president of the Majlis, Bahadur Yar Jung died. He fell a victim to the petty jealousies and intrigues which had set in the Majlis, and against which the Nawab did not take any precautions. He was not popular with the then government too—and his position with the Nizam was equally precarious—who being an intensely jealous man, was averse to see anyone so popular or powerful. It was only after his death that everyone realized what they had lost.

23. I am grateful to Syed Qasim Rizvi, the president of the Majlis, and the leader of the Razakar movement for supplying me with the details and helping me a great deal in writing this article.

Demise of the late Nawab brought into open the various parties who were clamouring for power and Abul Hasan Syed Ali—a local lawyer drew first blood. He was not the dominating personality that Bahadur Yar Jung was, and though he formed a strong party within the Ittehad he could not hold his position long and soon had to vacate his place for Maulana Mazhar Ali Kamil, who became the next President of the Majlis. The Maulana, a kind and a gentle person, would not think unkindly of anybody, and was too weak for the situation, and soon his lieutenants got the upper hand, and the Maulana was President in name only. Mazhar Ali Kamil could not hold his own for long and had to make room for Syed Kasim Rizvi—a lawyer from Latur, whose sincerity and loyalty to the cause of the Muslims and Hyderabad was never in doubt. He was a man of short stature, a charming and a dynamic personality, and a fine orator and a man who expressed his patriotic views in no veiled manner. He soon had the Muslim masses at his back and call. The Muslims wanted a strong leader to whom they could look up, especially after the unpleasantness between the Nizam and the late Quaid-i-Azam²⁴—and in Qasim Rizvi they saw the man of their dreams. While the late Bahadur Yar Jung always expressed himself in a dignified manner, Razvi hit straight at the point, and that is what the masses wanted in the circumstances in which they found themselves. After Sir Mirza Ismail took over as Prime Minister of the State, two persons holding diametrically opposite views were bound to clash sooner or later and a battle between them started almost immediately after Sir Mirza Ismail took over. The final clash came about the middle of 1947, and Sir Mirza who had by then lost the confidence of the Nizam resigned. Razvi, who had achieved this miracle in three months went up sky in the estimation of the masses—and he had stabilised his position.²⁵

After 1947, full attention was given by the central Majlis to the

24. For details see Sir Mirza Ismail "My public Life" and articles published in an Urdu Weekly Ittelaat of the Hyderabad Trust, Karachi dated 1st August, 1955, 1st September, 1955, 16th October, 1955 and 1st November, 1955 by Mr. Zahid Hussain, Nawab Moin Nawaz Jung, Mazhar Ali Kamil and Nawab Siddiq Ali Khan respectively.

25. Personal diary of Mr. Ashfaq Ahmed Khan, Chief Secretary to the Government of Hyderabad. I am grateful to Syed Qasim Razvi and Mr. Ashfaq Ahmad Khan for supplying me with details of the history of the Majlis after 1947 about which there is very little material available.

Razakar Movement, which had dwindled more or less after the death of Bahadur Yar Jung. Razvi coming fresh from the district of Usmanabad, where he was practising law in Latur, was in a better position to understand the need of strengthening the Razakars for the defence of the Muslims. Financially too, the condition of the Majlis had improved and it was in a position to provide the Razakars with arms. Moreover, Hyderabad at this time was getting desperately short of the necessities of life, as Indian Union had blocked her from all sides, and what is more, she was also short of arms and ammunitions which were so necessary for the maintenance of law and order. Law and order had, however, to be maintained at all costs and all avenues were explored. It was the result of these explorations that the so dreaded Razakar organization came into the limelight. Every political party has a volunteer organization of some sort and it was decided to expand this organization with some home made ineffective weapons. Their members naturally had to be large. This organization grew into formidable proportions in no time and their selfless work was of great value. Small groups of this organization were posted all over the dominion borders and also in areas which were expected to give trouble. As the Ramanand Tirath inspired raids increased, the utility of Razakars became clearer and they did some yeomen service in protection of life and property of border village inhabitants. Qasim Razvi was aiming to raise the strength of this organization to 5 lakhs and his spirited appeals began to bear fruits. Schools and college students left their education and joined the ranks of the Razakar organization. As it was difficult to supply everyone with a uniform only 1/3 of the Razakars were given uniforms, while the rest were given only badges.

For the training of the Razakars, the Majlis secured the services of the retired army men—and when the danger of the Indian attack became acute, the Razakars were placed under the command of the army.

Syed Qasim Razvi, the leader of the Razakar Movement was extremely proud of his organization and rightly so—for the services rendered by these young volunteers were of great value. These young men were not expected to defend the country against the Indian Union—for that was the job of the State's army. The Razakars were organiz-

ed only for the maintenance of law and order within the borders of the Nizam's dominions.

It was only at a very late stage, that the Razakars were made over to the army, on the discovery that the army was not strong enough to defend the state—and it was arranged that in the case of war with India, the first line of defence would be the army, and the Razakars would form the second line of defence behind the army. And it was Razakars indeed, who continued to fight even when the army had surrendered after three days of fighting. And according to Qasim Razvi the Razakars would have continued to fight a guerilla war with India for years before submitting shamelessly like the army, if they had been provided with proper weapons.

The Razakars movement, inspite of all services it rendered to the Muslims of the state, became extremely unpopular even among certain sections of the Muslim population during the last days of the struggle—and with due respects to their valuable services—there was enough ground for such a change of opinion. While the organization was small, supervision was effective, but as the number grew, supervision became loose and discipline lax. 'There are unsocial elements everywhere who are on the look out for opportunities like this and in to the fold of the Razakars also came in a number of such persons whose aims and objects were miles apart from what the Razakars stood for. These elements soon became pests, and started arson, loot and rape'. Every effort was made to put an end to such a state of affairs, but that required a strong leadership. Bahadur Yar Jung might have come up to the occasion if he had been alive; Qasim Razvi was a great leader no doubt, but he was a man of sentiments, who made the masses sway by their sentiments too—and when the situation was out of hands, he could not control it alone. It is a great misfortune that the Majlis, in their hour of excitement closed their eyes to the realities and committed certain blunders, for which the Muslim of the state had to suffer. There may be some exaggeration in the reports of the Hindu sources, of the atrocities committed by the Razakars. It has to be confessed with regret that within a short period the Razakars who had been doing such useful work became a menace to the security of the state and the Ittehad itself. They became completely out of control and even Razvi became despondent. Love of wealth and unrestrained power took hold of the Razakars who became a law unto themselves and times

out of number turned their attention to even the Muslims from whom in a number of cases they extorted large sums of money under pressure. Razvi's efforts to bring in some retired army officials to tighten discipline had some slight effect—but not much. Demands of scandalous nature started pouring in. Administration started crumbling, and the general tendency in the services was to look to Ittehad for support rather than the government.²⁶ The Government also could not control the situation and it seemed that Ittehad was the only power in the state.

It was a tragedy for which it is difficult to say who was responsible. Ittehad was sincere and fully realized the responsibility it had overtaken. Just as in France after the great Revolution, the revolutioners in their hour of excitement, lost hold of their high ideals and indulged in rowdism, in the same way the Razakars who began so well became victims of rowdy elements and soon they were not protecting the lives of the people but had become aggressors themselves.

26. Personal diary of Mr. Ashfaq Ahmad Khan, Chief Secretary to the Government of Hyderabad.